Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

86 ARISTOTLE’S METHOD IN METAPHYSICSSeventh Aporia (998 b 13–999 a 23 23)If we suppose that the principle of a thing is the general kind to which thething belongs (i.e. if we take up the former side of the previous aporia), thenhow general must this kind be? Is the principle of a thing the most general kindto which the thing belongs (i.e. the genus) or the least general kind (i.e. thespecies)?This aporia arises naturally if we take up the one side of the previousaporia. If this is the side that <strong>Aristotle</strong> will defend, then he will apparentlyargue, against Plato and the Platonists, that species are more basic thangenera; so he will argue, for example, that there are animals because there aredogs, cats, humans, etc, rather than vice versa. But perhaps <strong>Aristotle</strong> willnot defend this side at all, i.e. he will not argue that the ultimate principleof a thing is the general kind to which the thing belongs, whether this kindis conceived as the genus or as the species. We will take up this aporia inChapter 7, especially §5viii.Eighth Aporia (999 a 24– b 24)Do general kinds exist at all (whether as species or as genera) in addition to orbesides (para) sense-perceptible particulars?See comment under the fifth aporia. Again, the question is not so muchwhether <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that there are general kinds in reality; he clearlydoes think this. The question is how they are related to sense-perceptibleparticulars: whether and in what sense they exist ‘in addition to’ or‘besides’ (para) sense-perceptible particulars. But apparently he is alsoraising the more radical question here: are there general kinds at all,however they are conceived? He will argue that there must be, if things areto be intelligible and subject to explanation in the first place. We will takeup this aporia in Chapter 7, especially §5ix; see also Chapter 8.Ninth Aporia (999 b 24–1000 a 4)Are principles one in kind or one in number?In other words, are there as many principles as there are particularthings (so that my principle and your principle are different, although weboth belong to the same general kind), or are there as many principles asthere are kinds of things (so that my principle and your principle are thesame, since we belong to the same general kind)? At first it may seem that<strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that we must choose between these two sides. Buteventually he may argue rather that we can, and should, defend both sides