Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

312 CRITICISM OF PLATO’S THEORY OF FORMSexplanatory account of its essence (see Chapter 2§3ii). Such explanatoryaccounts of the essence of things they call ‘definitions’ (horismoi). Thus itis striking that in our passage he says that explanatory knowledge is basedin definitions, i.e. it has definitions as its principle and starting-point(archē). It is also striking that he characterizes such definitions as‘universal’ (katholou); for both Plato and <strong>Aristotle</strong> think that explanatoryknowledge (epistēmē) is universal knowledge (see Chapter 2§3ii).Incidentally, when <strong>Aristotle</strong> talks about Socrates here, and when he arguesthat Socrates’ view is like Plato’s in that they both search for explanatoryknowledge and for the essence of things, but also unlike Plato’s in thatonly Plato separated the essences of things, he means the historicalSocrates, not Socrates as depicted in Plato’s dialogues. However, we mayquestion whether he really succeeds in representing the historical Socrates;we may surmise rather that the way in which he represents Socratesactually fits Plato, or at least part of Plato’s work, and that probably<strong>Aristotle</strong> bases his representation of Socrates primarily on those of Plato’sdialogues which we tend to refer to as ‘Socratic’. These are dialogues inwhich Plato depicts Socrates as searching for the essence of an ethicalvirtue or virtue in general (see, for example, Euthyphro, Charmides, Laches,Protagoras, Meno). This confirms that it is Plato himself that is, on the onehand, committed to a general theory of essence—a theory that <strong>Aristotle</strong>largely accepts but also, on the other hand, to a more particular theory ofessence, which claims that essences are separate and distinct from thechanging things, and which <strong>Aristotle</strong> rejects.So, according to <strong>Aristotle</strong>, what is distinctive of Plato’s theory of essence,as opposed to what it shares with his own theory, is the view that essencesare separate and distinct from sense-perceptible and in general changingthings. But in the above passage <strong>Aristotle</strong> also identifies the reasoning thatled Plato and the Platonists to the view that essences are separate. He setsout this reasoning as follows:P1. Explanatory knowledge is knowledge of something changeless.For it is, ultimately, knowledge of the essence of things; and essencesare changeless.P2. But the things that we perceive through the senses arechanging (or even: changing in every way).Therefore:C1. Explanatory knowledge is not of the things that we perceivethrough the senses. But