Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEING 249and Plato). On the contrary, they can be shared by distinct particulars,provided that these belong to the same kind and species.But what is distinctive of species-universals, on the presentinterpretation, is above all that a particular thing (e.g. Socrates) is the verything that it is, i.e. it has the essence that it has, precisely in virtue of aspecies-universal being true of it and in virtue of its belonging to aparticular species. For example, Socrates evidently is not the very thingthat he is in virtue of being pale, five foot tall, educated, healthy, just, etc.But neither is he the very thing that he is in virtue of being, for example,an animal, i.e. in virtue of a generic-universal being true of him and hisbelonging to a particular genus. For the cock belongs just as much to thisgenus, but evidently Socrates is not the very thing that he is in virtue ofbeing a particular kind of bird. Rather, on this interpretation, Socrates isthe very thing that he is in virtue of being human, i.e. in virtue of a speciesuniversalbeing true of him and his belonging to a particular species.Before we consider how these two interpretations, i.e. ours and thealternative interpretation, in general compare with each other, it is naturalto ask how this alternative interpretation fits the text of VII. 13. For itappears to be ruled out by what <strong>Aristotle</strong> says, especially when he says:For it appears impossible that any of the things that are universallypredicated [ta katholou legomena] should be a primary being [ousia].For, first, the primary being of each thing is peculiar to each thing,but the universal is common; for that thing is called a universalwhich by its nature is capable of holding good of [i.e. being true of]several things.(VII. 13, 1038 b 8–12)This certainly appears to say that no universal is a primary being; it doesnot appear to say only that not every universal is a primary being. Thisimpression is confirmed when, at the end of VII. 16, <strong>Aristotle</strong> sums up theconclusion of the argument by saying: ‘So it is evident that none of thethings that are universally predicated [ta katholou legomena] is a primarybeing’ (1041 a 3–5).But whether the text allows for the alternative interpretation depends onwhat <strong>Aristotle</strong> means by ‘the things that are universally predicated’ (takatholou legomena). If he means, simply, ‘universals’, then he is evidentlysaying that no universal is a primary being. So thealternative interpretation is ruled out. But perhaps this phrase serves ratherto indicate a certain distinctive type of universals, i.e. those that areuniversally predicated. If so, it is only of these universals that <strong>Aristotle</strong>