Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

CRITICISM OF PLATO’S THEORY OF FORMS 333possibility of there being things that are separate and distinct from natureand in general from changing, material things. Rather, his objection isdirected against the view that all essences are separate and distinct fromchanging, material things. In particular, he argues that the essences ofchanging things need not be thought of as separate from those things(which is how Plato thinks of them), but may be thought of as inseparablefrom, and indeed as identical with, those things. He also argues that if (asPlato does) one thinks that the essences of changing things are separatefrom those things, this leads to difficulties; and that his own view avoidssuch difficulties and is in general better off.But we may wonder why <strong>Aristotle</strong> is confident that his owncommitment to a single transcendent being—God, is not subject tosimilar difficulties. In particular, why is he confident that his owncommitment to a single transcendent thing—God, is not vulnerable to thethird-man argument, which he employs unsparingly against Plato and thePlatonists? Formally, the answer is evident: while God explains rationalchange, and while God is rational activity, this activity does not consist inrational change—indeed, God is completely changeless (see Chapter 8§8).Formally, this may succeed in deflecting the third-man argument. For todirect this argument against <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s God would be to argue that becauseGod is subject to the same rational change as the change that he explains inthe universe, therefore, a further God is needed to explain the rationalchange that is common to the first God and the universe, and so onwithout end. <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s response appears to be, precisely, that God is notsubject to the same kind of rational change as the universe. Indeed, God ischangeless. But although this response is formally successful, it highlightsour original puzzle: how can God be active yet changeless? (seeChapter 8§8).