Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

BEING QUA BEING AND PRIMARY BEING 117that primary being with regard to each thing is, precisely, the essenceof the thing.)A central problem with <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s theory of theCategoriesHowever, <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s theory in the Categories leads to a particular andcentral problem, a problem that he points out in the Metaphysics (seeespecially VII. 3; we will consider this problem, and his response to it,more fully later). For suppose that (CAT1) the ultimate subject ofpredication with regard to a thing is a particular, whereas (CAT2) theessence of a thing is a universal; hence (CAT3), the ultimate subject ofpredication with regard to a thing is different from the essence of the thing.Then it follows that there is nothing that the ultimate subject ofpredication (and the particular) is essentially and in virtue of itself (kath’hauto). Rather, the ultimate subject of predication (and the particular)depends for its essence on its relation to something other than itself,namely, a universal. But this means that, in virtue of itself, the ultimatesubject of predication (and the particular) is indeterminate. But this resultmay well appear unacceptable.Why is it unacceptable to think that, in virtue of itself, the ultimatesubject of predication and the particular is indeterminate? On its own,perhaps, this view may not be unacceptable. Plato, for example, thinks thatsense-perceptible, changing particulars are indeterminate in virtue ofthemselves and depend for their determination on their relation tosomething other than themselves, namely, the ‘ideas’ or ‘forms’. But theview that, in virtue of itself, the ultimate subject of predication and theparticular is indeterminate certainly appears unacceptable, if it is combinedwith the view that (CAT4) primary being with regard to each thing is theultimate subject of predication with regard to that thing. (Plato rejects thisview, so his position may not be unacceptable.) For it is natural to thinkthat primary being, whatever it turns out to be, cannot be something that,in virtue of itself, is indeterminate. In general, a primary being cannotdepend on something else for its being something determinate, for then itwould not be primary without qualification. We recall that primary beingis, precisely, what does not depend on other things for its being a being,something that is. But if a primary being does not depend on other thingsfor its being a being, then it is natural to think that neither does it dependon other things for its being something determinate. For it is natural tothink that something cannot be a being, unless it is something determinate,and that its being something determinate is at least part of the explanation