Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

254 THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEINGemerges most clearly in the last chapter of book VII, i.e. VII. 17. There<strong>Aristotle</strong> argues that the essence and the form of a particular material thing,e.g. Socrates, is the principle that explains why this thing is the particularthing it is, Socrates. It does so by explaining why the matter of thisparticular material thing, Socrates, constitutes the particular thing that itconstitutes, Socrates. So the essence and the form of a particular materialthing explains something about a particular material thing, and it does soin so far as this particular material thing is the very particular that it is, e.g.Socrates (as opposed to, for example, Plato). If we add that the relationbetween a particular material thing and its essence and form is a relationbetween the particular material thing and itself, then we directly obtain theresult that the essence and the form of a particular material thing is itself aparticular. In the final analysis, this is why the essence and the form is aparticular; i.e. because, first, it is identical with the particular materialthing whose essence and form it is, and, second, it explains somethingabout the particular material thing in so far as this particular material thingis the very particular that it is, e.g. Socrates (as opposed to, for example,Plato).So far, it may appear that the essence and the form is only a particular.But really all that has emerged is that the essence and the form is primarilya particular. The question remains whether it is also, as a consequence, auniversal. Consider the way in which Socrates’ essence and form explainswhy Socrates is the particular thing that he is— Socrates. Compare this tothe way in which Plato’s essence and form explains why Plato is theparticular thing that he is—Plato. These forms are two, not one; for theyare particulars. Nevertheless, it emerges that the way in which Socrates’essence and form explains why Socrates is the particular thing that he is—Socrates, and the way in which Plato’s essence and form explains why Platois the particular thing that he is— Plato, are really exactly the same way.For the explanation is in both cases the following: the essence and the formof a particular material thing, x, e.g. of Socrates or Plato, explains why thisparticular material thing, x, is the very particular that it is, e.g. Socrates orPlato, by explaining why this material thing, x, is the determinate and welldefinedparticular that it is, e.g. a particular human being. The mode ofexplanation is exactly the same in both cases—the case of Socrates and thecase of Plato—because to explain why a particular material thing, e.g.Socrates or Plato, is the very particular that it is is to explain why it is thedeterminate and well-defined particular that it is, e.g. a particular humanbeing. But evidently Socrates and Plato are both human beings. In general,if something explains why a particular material thing, e.g. Socrates, is thevery particular it is by explaining why it is the determinate and well-