Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

252 THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEINGThird, we have seen that <strong>Aristotle</strong> argues that primary being is both theessence and the ultimate subject of predication; and that strictly one andthe same thing is both an essence and an ultimate subject of predication.But this directly implies that the essence is not a universal; for evidentlythe ultimate subject of predication is not a universal. So the essence of aparticular thing (e.g. the essence of Socrates, i.e. his being human) is notthe general kind, or the species, to which the thing belongs (e.g. beinghuman); for a general kind and a species are universals. Of course, thealternative interpretation will respond that <strong>Aristotle</strong> does not really thinkthat strictly one and the same thing is both an essence and an ultimatesubject of predication. For it will argue that <strong>Aristotle</strong>, in V. 8,distinguishes between two senses of ousia or ‘primary being’: ousia in thesense of ‘the ultimate subject of predication’; and ousia in the sense of‘essence’. The alternative interpretation will conclude that <strong>Aristotle</strong> is notreally committed to the view that strictly one and the same thing is both anessence and an ultimate subject of predication. This response is veryimportant. For it shows that the alternative interpretation relies on theview that, because <strong>Aristotle</strong> distinguishes two senses of ousia, therefore hedoes not think that strictly one and the same thing is ousia in both thesesenses. But we have already responded to this line of reasoning. Basically, itis true that <strong>Aristotle</strong> distinguishes two senses of ousia; but it in no wayfollows that he does not think that strictly one and the same thing can beousia in both these senses (see §5v of this chapter).Finally, there is a particular and basic problem with the alternativeinterpretation. It appears that in general <strong>Aristotle</strong> wants to argue thatprimary being is likewise the primary object of knowledge. He also arguesthat the primary object of knowledge is the essence. For all knowledge, andin particular all explanatory knowledge and science, which is knowledgeabove all, is ultimately derived from knowledge of essence. (SeeChapter 2§3.) At the same time, he argues that primary being is theultimate subject of predication, which is a particular and not a universal.But then, if primary being and the primary object of knowledge are strictlyto coincide, the essence, too, must be a particular and not a universal. Sothe essence cannot be a universal, as it is on the alternative interpretation.(We will return to this point in a moment, in §5x of this chapter.)