Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

CRITICISM OF PLATO’S THEORY OF FORMS 305is as follows: explanatory knowledge is basically of the essence of things; butthe changing things do not have an essence and there is nothingdeterminate that they are in virtue of themselves; therefore, essences, whichis what explanatory knowledge is basically of, are separate and distinct fromchanging things. But <strong>Aristotle</strong> responds that his own theory of essenceboth satisfies the view that there are essences and that explanatoryknowledge is basically of the essence of things (see Chapter 7§5ix), whileat the same time it avoids problems that arise from Plato’s view thatessences are separate and distinct from the changing things.Finally, when we consider Plato’s and <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s shared project ofsearching for the essence of things, it is natural to ask whether this search isat all conducted along the same lines. We have seen that <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s searchfor the essence of things begins with changing things as we encounter themthrough our sense perception and in our experience (see Chapter 2§3i). Isthis also where Plato’s search for the essence of things begins, i.e. with thechanging things with which we are directly familiar? This question is infact controversial, and it is sometimes thought that when Plato argues forseparate essences and forms, his argument entirely bypasses changing,sense-perceptible things. However, there is reason to think that Plato’ssearch for the essence of things likewise begins with changing, senseperceptiblethings. This is certainly true in a central argument for theintroduction of essences and forms, i.e. the argument at the end of thedialogue Phaedo (95e-101c). For there the essences and forms areintroduced as the conclusion of an argument that starts with the question,‘Why (dia tí) are things as they are?’, i.e. ‘What is the explanation andcause (aitia) of things being as they are?’ But the things of which thisquestion is asked are, at least to begin with, sense-perceptible and ingeneral changing things, e.g. ‘why human beings grow’ (see 96c7). Indeed,Plato emphasizes here that the question is, at least to begin with, ‘Whysomething is, and comes to be, and ceases to be?’ (see 96a9–10, 97b5–6,97c7, 97c8-d1 and 101b9-c7). We may note also that here Plato expresslyidentifies forms (eidē and ideai, here generally referred to as the things thatare auta kath’ hauta, ‘themselves in virtue of themselves’, see 100b) withessences (ousiai, see 101c2–4). So it is appropriate to think that althoughthe search for the essence of things reaches very different results in Platoand <strong>Aristotle</strong>, and although it is in general conducted in different ways, itbegins in the same place, i.e. with changing, sense-perceptible things, thethings with which we are directly familiar. For the search for the essenceof things is, for both Plato and <strong>Aristotle</strong>, the search for the mostexplanatory knowledge of things, and in the first instance of those thingswith which we are directly familiar from sense perception and experience.