Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

PHENOMENALISM AND RELATIVISM 161speak about things; but evidently, (P2) we can think and speak aboutthings; therefore, (C1/C2) PNC is true of things, and things are not radicallyindeterminate. (Here P1/P3 and C1/C2 are simply the result ofconjoining, for the sake of brevity, P1 with P3 and C1 with C2.) But nowsuppose that one draws a sharp distinction between appearances, i.e. thingsas they appear to us and in general as we conceive them, and the thingsthemselves. Then one may argue that it is evident that (P2) we can thinkand speak about things, only if this means that:(P2-REL) We can think and speak of appearances, i.e. of things asthey appear to us and as we conceive them.For it is not evident, one may argue, that (P2) we can think and speakabout things, if this means that:(P2-M) We can think and speak of the things themselves and ofthings without qualification.But this shows that <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s argument, if it succeeds at all, establishesonly that:(C-REL) PNC is true of appearances, i.e. of things as they appear tous and as we conceive them.(The argument will succeed in showing this, if we also introduce the samenotion of things, i.e. things as they appear to us and as we conceive them,in its major premise, P1/P3.) But of course, <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s real aim was todefend not (C-REL), but rather:(C-M) PNC is true of the things themselves and of things withoutqualification. (= PNC-M)So if, as does phenomenalism and relativism, we draw a sufficiently sharpdistinction between appearances and the things themselves, we mayentirely undermine <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s argument in defence of PNC-M and of theclaim that the things themselves are determinate and well-defined.Before we turn to <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s response to this challenge, it is important toemphasize that he may not want to conduct the response on terms thatphenomenalism and relativism accept. In particular, he may not think thatthere is such a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, things as theyappear to us and as we conceive them and, on the other hand, the things