Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

296 THE ULTIMATE CAUSE OF CHANGE: GODanything, to be, i.e. part of the basic project of the Metaphysics? Earlier inthe Metaphysics (in VI. 1) <strong>Aristotle</strong> argued that if there is a divine being, orGod, then the science of this being will at once be the science of what it isfor something, anything, to be (see Chapter 4§5). So we would expect thatwhen now, in book XII, he argues that there is a divine being, or God, thisis directly relevant to the basic question in the Metaphysics, ‘What is it forsomething, anything, to be?’ But it is striking that nowhere in book XII does<strong>Aristotle</strong> make explicit what this relevance is. He does not make explicitwhat the relation is between the question of book XII, ‘What explains therational change in nature as a whole?’, and the basic question in theMetaphysics. At the same time, there are clear indications in book XII thathe thinks that there is a direct relation between the two questions (see §1 ofthis chapter).So what is the relation between these two questions, i.e. the question,‘What explains the rational change in nature as a whole?’, and the question,‘What is it for something, anything, to be?’? On the one hand, thequestions appear too different to be related directly. For we have seen thatthe former question, i.e. the question in book XII, is associated with thequestion: ‘Why are there changing, material things whose change isrational, i.e. subject to explanation?’ This is an example of a question ofthe type: ‘Why are there things that are F?’ But the question, ‘What is itfor something, anything, to be?’, is not an example of a question of thistype at all. In general, we must not confuse questions of the type, (1) ‘Whyare there things that are F?’, with questions of the type, (2) ‘Why are thethings that are F F?’, i.e. ‘What is it for something, anything, to be F?’ Thebasic question in the Metaphysics, ‘What is it for something, anything, tobe?’, belongs to type 2, not type 1.On the other hand, it is striking, and it is surely not a coincidence, thatwhat God fundamentally explains, namely, why changing, material thingsare intelligible and subject to explanation, is a crucial part of whatconstitutes what it is for something, anything, to be a being, somethingthat is (see Chapter 7§5 especially ix–x). This shows that there is anobvious relation between the question, ‘Why are the changing, materialthings intelligible and subject to explanation?’, and the basic question inthe Metaphysics, ‘What is it for something, anything, to be?’ The relation isevidently along the following lines. The answer to the basic question of theMetaphysics includes, as a crucial part, the claim that for something,anything, to be a being, something that is, is for it to be intelligible andsubject to explanation. Indeed, it includes anything that is in turn requiredfor things to be intelligible and subject to explanation. This answer isabout all things, not just changing and material things. But it is also, and