Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEING 227accident and by circumstance that Socrates is, for example, pale, snubnosed,five foot tall, etc. But the crucial point is that the ultimate subjectof predication is the very thing that it is (e.g. a particular human being)not in virtue of its relation to something else, but simply in virtue of itself.As he says, it is a kath’ hauto legomenon. And the reason why the ultimatesubject of predication is the very thing that it is simply in virtue of itself is,precisely, that it is identical with its essence.So <strong>Aristotle</strong> argues that a thing, in the sense of an ultimate subject ofpredication, is identical with its essence. This is a striking, but also apuzzling view. But it is also clear why in general he wants to defend thisview. For suppose that the ultimate subject of predication and the essenceare not identical. Then the ultimate subject of predication will, in virtue ofitself, be something indeterminate. For it is in virtue of its essence that it isthe determinate and well-defined thing that it is. But something which is,in virtue of itself, indeterminate, cannot be primary being. So the ultimatesubject of predication will no longer be primary being. Only the essence,when set against the ultimate subject of predication, will be primary being.But this, <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks, is an unacceptable result. This also appears to bethe thrust of the difficult argument in VII. 6, 1031 a 31f, especially a 31– b 3and b 15–18 (we will return to this argument later, see Chapter 9§§5–6).But what does <strong>Aristotle</strong> think is unacceptable about the view that onlythe essence of things, and not those things themselves, i.e. the ultimatesubjects of predication, are primary beings? We should note that this isprecisely the view that he here ascribes to Plato (see especially 1031 b 15–18). And he criticizes this view at length, both here and elsewhere. So wemay set aside for later, when we consider his critique of Plato, hisobjections to the view that only the essence of things, and not those thingsthemselves, are primary beings (see Chapter 9). Still, we can see what ingeneral he finds objectionable about this view. For the things that he isconsidering here (in books VII–IX) are material things—things that aresubject to change and especially generation and destruction. But if thesethings are not primary beings, and if primary beings are rather some otherthings—namely essences as opposed to ultimate subjects—then this meansthat material things do not have an essence, i.e. they are not, in virtue ofthemselves and in virtue of being things that are subject to change andespecially generation and destruction, something determinate and welldefined.Plato is happy to accept this result. But <strong>Aristotle</strong> finds itunacceptable.But <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s view that a thing, in the sense of an ultimate subject ofpredication, is identical with its essence may still strike us as puzzling.Surely, we may object, a thing, in the sense of an ultimate subject