Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

PHENOMENALISM AND RELATIVISM 181in virtue of its relation to any other thing, but simply in virtue of itself (i.e.suppose that metaphysical relativism is false). It follows immediately that itis not the case that this thing is F in virtue of its relation to our senses. If itwere F in virtue of its relation to our senses, then it would not be F simplyin virtue of itself. But if the thing is F not in virtue of its relation to oursenses, but simply in virtue of itself, i.e. if the thing is F independently ofus and our senses, then, presumably, we can be mistaken in our beliefsabout it; i.e. we may believe, perhaps on the basis of how this thingappears to our senses under certain conditions, that the thing is G (whereG is different from and contrary to F). But then it will not be the case thatall our sense perceptions, and in general all our beliefs about this thing,will be true. So, if we suppose that metaphysical relativism is false, then itfollows that phenomenalism is false. In other words, phenomenalismentails metaphysical relativism.Second, why does he think that if we observe that phenomenalismentails metaphysical relativism, and if at the same time we take account ofthe best line of reasoning in support of phenomenalism (i.e. the reasoningset out in IV. 5), then we will recognize that this line of reasoning leadsnot so much to phenomenalism, but to epistemological relativism? Tounderstand this argument we need (as <strong>Aristotle</strong> indeed indicates here) torecall the reasoning behind phenomenalism, and in particular the claimthat:1. Our sense perceptions, and in general our beliefs, are onlyabout things as they appear to us and as we conceive them; theyare not about the things themselves. (=claim 7 in the previoussubsection)But it is perhaps natural to understand this claim to mean that:2. Our sense perceptions, and in general our beliefs, are only ofthings that are what they are only relative to our senses, and ingeneral to our minds; they are not about things that are whatthey are simply in virtue of themselves.The difference between 1 and 2 is that claim 1 is a primarilyepistemological claim, which limits the scope and the object of our senseperceptions and our beliefs to things as they appear to us and as weconceive them. Claim 2, on the other hand, contains also a metaphysicalclaim, namely, the claim that the things that we sense and hold beliefs