Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

CRITICISM OF PLATO’S THEORY OF FORMS 311<strong>Aristotle</strong> goes on to argue against the Platonic view that essences areseparate and distinct from (para) the sense-perceptible and in generalchanging things. But for the moment we are concerned not with hiscriticism, but with his diagnosis of the reasons that led Plato and thePlatonists to this view.The first thing to note about this diagnosis is that <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks ofPlato’s theory of separate and distinct forms as a theory of essence. For heargues that Socrates was among the first to search for the essence of things,or at least of some things: the ethical virtues. He also argues that, unlikeSocrates, Plato argued that essences are separate and distinct from senseperceptibleand in general changing things. But <strong>Aristotle</strong> concludes that itis, exactly, the separate and distinct essences that Plato calls ‘ideas’ (ideai) or‘forms’ (eidē). It is extremely important that he thinks of Plato’s theory offorms as a theory of essence. For this shows that he thinks that he andPlato are engaged in the same overall project, i.e. the project of searchingfor the essence of things, even if they disagree fundamentally about howthis project is to be carried out and what conclusions it will reach.<strong>Aristotle</strong> also identifies the motivation behind not only Plato’s but alsoSocrates’ search for the essence of things; for he says that this motivation isthe search for explanatory knowledge (epistēmē) and the view thatexplanatory knowledge requires knowledge of the essence of things. Hereit is particularly important to recognize that <strong>Aristotle</strong> himself shares thiscommitment, the commitment to the search for explanatory knowledge,and he shares the view that explanatory knowledge requires knowledge ofthe essence of things. We know in general that this is his standpoint, buthe also indicates here that it is his standpoint. For he ascribes the search forexplanatory knowledge, and the view that such knowledge requiresknowledge of the essence of things not only to Plato, with whosedistinctive view about essences he disagrees, but also to Socrates, who doesnot, he thinks, hold Plato’s distinctive view about essences, i.e. the viewthat essences are separate and distinct from changing things, and withwhom in general he agrees.If in general we ask why Plato and <strong>Aristotle</strong> think that explanatoryknowledge requires knowing the essence of things, and hence requiressupposing that things have an essence in the first place, we may in outlinesuggest the following answer. Explanatory knowledge (epistēmē) isknowledge not only of what things are like, but also why things are as theyare. But, by reflecting on the very nature of explanation and therequirements for adequate and complete explanations, Plato and <strong>Aristotle</strong>conclude that in order to explain why a thing is as it is, we need anexplanatory account of what the thing is in virtue of itself, i.e. an