Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

152 THE DEFENCE OF PNCthere is a property, F, such that x is F and x cannot at once be not-F. Thisproperty, it emerges, is the essence of this thing, x, i.e. it is that whichdetermines what this very thing, x, is. But the disputant of PNC, againstwhom this defence is directed, has no problem with assuming from thestart that the property, F, is a single, determinate, well-defined property,i.e. it is this very property, F, as opposed to any other property. For hispoint is that this very property, F, can be at once true and not true of oneand the same particular thing, x. So to argue that this property, F, is thevery property that it is, and not any other property, would be to argue whatthe disputant is already happy to assume.It is important to emphasize that <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that the defenceestablishes that it is particulars, not just properties, that have an essence.For it will emerge that the view that precisely particulars have an essence isvital in <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s attempt to answer the basic question of metaphysics,‘What is it for a thing to be a being, something that is?’ (see later in thischapter and Chapter 7§§3 and 5v).How are we to assess this defence, i.e. the defence of the view that wecan think and speak about a particular thing, x (e.g. Socrates), only if thisparticular thing, x, has an essence (or at least if it depends on a thing thathas an essence)? Let us set aside the question of whether this essence willbelong to the particulars themselves and without qualification or it willbelong only to particulars as we conceive them (see Chapter 6 for thisquestion). Still, the defence gives rise to a number of questions.First, does the defence establish that each thing has a single, unitaryessence, or may the essence of each thing be complex and manifold?<strong>Aristotle</strong> is aware of this question. He argues that what has beenestablished is only that the essence of each thing cannot be indefinitelycomplex and manifold, but must contain a determinate number of parts(cf. hōrismenoi ton arithmon, 1006 b 4). For if it is indefinitely complex andmanifold, it may after all contain contradictory properties (see 1006 a 34–b 11, translating apeiron as ‘indefinite’).Second, even if the defence establishes that particulars have an essence,of what particulars does it establish this ? Does it establish this of theparticulars with which we are directly familiar from sense perception andexperience, e.g. Socrates (see 1007 b 5f. for <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s use of Socrates as anexample)? Perhaps the particulars that have an essence will rather be theultimate parts of the particulars with which we are directly familiar. Wemight even wonder whether the argument establishes that particulars (inthe plural) have an essence. For perhaps it may establish rather that there issome one particular, such as the universe as a whole, that has an essence.