Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

218 THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEINGBut it is important to emphasize what motivates <strong>Aristotle</strong> to argue thateach changing, material thing has only one essence. For he wants, precisely,to argue that changing, material things, and not only the universals thatare true of them, have an essence. And he wants to argue that a changing,material thing has an essence in virtue of itself, i.e. in virtue of being theparticular thing that it is, and not only in virtue of the universals that aretrue of it having an essence. For example, the particular thing, Socrates,and not only universals such as being human, snub-nosed, five foot tall,etc, have an essence. And this particular thing, Socrates, has an essence invirtue of being the particular thing that it is, and not only in virtue of eachof the universals that are true of it having an essence.This view is directly opposed to Plato’s view, which is that it is only orprimarily universals that have an essence, and that changing, materialparticulars have an essence, if at all, only in virtue of each of the universalsthat are true of them having an essence (see also Chapter 9). In response tothe same question, i.e. whether each thing has only one essence or it hasindefinitely many essences, Plato agues that it is only or primarilyuniversals that have an essence, and that each universal has just one essence—otherwise it would not be the determinate and well-defined universalthat it is. So if indefinitely many universals are true of a changing, materialthing, and if none of these have a decisive claim to being the essence of thething, then Plato will simply conclude that changing, material things donot have an essence at all and that only universals have an essence. Thiswill be in tune with his general conclusion that changing, material thingsare, in virtue of themselves, indeterminate and depend on their relation touniversals for their determination.So it emerges that <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s distinctive answer to the question whethereach changing, material thing (e.g. Socrates) has only one essence or it hasindefinitely many essences is really part of his attempt to argue thatchanging, material things are determinate simply in virtue of themselvesand not in virtue of their relation to universals (see also §3 of this chapter).But why does <strong>Aristotle</strong> argue that each changing, material thing (e.g.Socrates) has only one essence, not indefinitely many essences, i.e. as manyessences as it has properties? Why, in other words, does he want to arguethat a changing, material thing has an essence in virtue of itself, i.e. invirtue of being the particular thing that it is, and not only in virtue of theuniversals that are true of it having an essence? Suppose that a thing, x, hasindefinitely many essences, i.e. as many essences as it has properties. Whatthis means is that there is no one thing, E, that this very thing, x, is; on thecontrary, what this very thing, x, is is indefinitely many things, E1, E2,etc. But what this means, apparently, is that the thing, x, which we