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Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

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96 BEING QUA BEING AND PRIMARY BEING(things, or plants, that are not roses). But then the questi<strong>on</strong>, ‘What is abeing?’, will not be possible—at least not if this questi<strong>on</strong> depends <strong>on</strong> theanalogy with more familiar questi<strong>on</strong>s such as, ‘What is a rose?’So we cannot, apparently, c<strong>on</strong>ceive of being, as a whole and qua being,by setting it against something outside it. Still, perhaps we can c<strong>on</strong>ceive ofbeing, as a whole and qua being, by focusing instead <strong>on</strong> what is inside it,and <strong>on</strong> the fact that everything is inside it. For evidently being includeseverything that there is. So how can we c<strong>on</strong>ceive of being, as a whole andqua being, as the sum of everything that there is? It is natural to think thatwe can do so in the following way: just as it is familiar that there aredistincti<strong>on</strong>s between different things in so far as they are all F (e.g. in so faras they are plants, we may think of the distincti<strong>on</strong> between roses and otherkinds of plants), so we may suppose that there is a distincti<strong>on</strong> betweendifferent things simply in so far as they are all beings, things that are. Andjust as we may c<strong>on</strong>ceive of all plants as the sum of all the kinds of plants thatthere are, so we may c<strong>on</strong>ceive of all beings as the sum of all the kinds ofbeings that there are. In this way, being, as a whole and qua being, will,precisely, be the sum of everything that there is. We may represent this sumas follows (supposing, for the sake of the example, that the distincti<strong>on</strong>between different things simply in so far as they are all beings is thedistincti<strong>on</strong> between changing and changeless beings): (This representati<strong>on</strong>will lead to incoherence. We have set it out here precisely in order to showhow it leads to incoherence.)But there is a problem with this attempt to c<strong>on</strong>ceive of being, as a wholeand qua being. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Aristotle</str<strong>on</strong>g> states this problem in book III, the book ofaporiai; see the seventh aporia, especially 998 b 22–27. The following is aninterpretati<strong>on</strong> of the way in which he states the problem there. C<strong>on</strong>sider,for example, the distincti<strong>on</strong> of different plants into deciduous and

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