Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

196 THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEINGthat primary being with regard to it is for it to be, precisely, human. Here<strong>Aristotle</strong> assumes that to be human is the essence of the thing about whichwe are thinking—the particular human being.The reasoning in this example appears to be this. Even if the thingabout which we are thinking, the particular human being, is in fact pale,or warm, or five foot tall, it is not a being, something that is, in virtue ofbeing pale, or warm, or five foot tall. For it is not its being pale, or warm,or five foot tall that ultimately explains why this thing is a being,something that is. This is because such things as being pale, warm or fivefoot tall are themselves beings only in virtue of their relation to, precisely,such things as a particular human being (see 1028 a 18–20). Rather, thething that we are thinking about is, apparently, a being, something that is,precisely in virtue of being human, i.e. in virtue of its essence. For,apparently, it is its being human, and in general its essence, that ultimatelyexplains why it is a being, something that is. This last point in particular,although it may appear plausible, will need especially to be defended.Second suggestionPrimary being with regard to each thing is the ultimate subject ofpredication (to hupokeimenon) with regard to that thing and the particular(to kath’ hekaston) that this thing is (see 1028 a 25–27). For example(1028 a 20–31), if we are puzzled about whether such things as walking,sitting or being healthy are beings at all, then we may naturally argue thatsuch things are not beings in virtue of themselves (kath’ hauta), but rather,if anything, it is a particular human being, i.e. one that is walking, sittingor healthy, and of which these things, walking, sitting and being healthy,are true, that is a being in virtue of itself. We recall that, in general, to be aprimary being is to be something that is a being in virtue of itself and notin virtue of its relation to other things. So we will naturally conclude thatsuch things as walking, sitting or being healthy are beings only in virtue oftheir relation to other things, i.e. the relation, being true of another thing;and that primary being is rather, if anything, that of which such things aswalking, sitting or being healthy are ultimately true. In general, we mayconclude that primary being with regard to each thing is, if anything, theultimate subject of predication with regard to that thing and the particularthing that this is.We may summarize these initial candidates for primary being and nonprimarybeing as follows. Primary being with regard to each thing (e.g.Socrates) is either the essence of that thing (e.g. being human) or the ultimatesubject of predication with regard to that thing (e.g. the particular thing that