Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

universals are separate, in the sense of ‘separate’ in which this means thatuniversals do not depend for their being beings, things that are, on theirbeing true of particulars, hence on particulars existing in relation to them.In general, it is crucial to recognize that we cannot infer from the claimthat one thing, x, is ontologically independent of another thing, y, that xcan exist without y existing (or, without y existing in relation to x). Inother words, we cannot infer from:thatP. x is a being simply in virtue of itself and not in virtue of itsrelation to any other thing, y,Q. x can exist without y existing (or, without y existing in relation tox).P asserts that something, x, does not depend on anything else, y, for itsbeing a being, something that is. But Q asserts that x can exist without yexisting (or, without y existing in relation to x). To see that P does notentail Q, let us recall what it means to say that something, x, does notdepend on anything else, y, for its being a being, something that is. Thismeans that it is not the case that x is a being in virtue of its relation toanything else, y; i.e. what explains what it is for x to be a being, or why x isa being, is not its relation to anything else, y. But from this we cannotinfer that x can exist without anything else, y, existing in relation to it. Ingeneral, we cannot infer from:that:P*. What explains what it is for x to be a being, or why x is a being,is not its relation to any other thing, y,Q. x can exist without y existing (or, without y existing in relation tox).This is because quite generally we cannot infer from:that:THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEING 203P**. What explains what it is for x to be F, or why x is F, is not itsrelation to y,