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Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

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THE ULTIMATE EXPLANATIONS OF ALL THINGS 31for its c<strong>on</strong>sequences, but for its own sake, but he also thinks that the searchfor such knowledge, and the enjoyment and c<strong>on</strong>templati<strong>on</strong> of it <strong>on</strong>ce found,is a central c<strong>on</strong>stituent in the happy life, the life worth living for a humanbeing (see especially Ni<strong>com</strong>achean Ethics, book X).2How explanatory knowledge differs from sensepercepti<strong>on</strong> and experienceAt the opening of the <strong>Metaphysics</strong> (I. 1) <str<strong>on</strong>g>Aristotle</str<strong>on</strong>g> argues that there is afundamental difference between sense percepti<strong>on</strong> (aisthēsis) and experience(empeiria), <strong>on</strong> the <strong>on</strong>e hand, and science (epistēmē) and art (technē), <strong>on</strong> theother hand. Each of these is a capacity for knowledge, and we humanspossess all of these capacities, whereas other animals possess <strong>on</strong>ly sensepercepti<strong>on</strong> and, to a limited extent, experience. But the fundamentaldifference between the first two and the last two capacities for knowledgeis this: sense percepti<strong>on</strong> and experience are capacities for knowing thatsomething is the case, but not for knowing why it is the case; science andart, <strong>on</strong> the other hand, are capacities for knowing why something is thecase. So, unlike sense percepti<strong>on</strong> and experience, science and art arecapacities for explanatory knowledge, i.e. knowledge of why something isthe case or why it is as it is.The distincti<strong>on</strong> between n<strong>on</strong>-explanatory knowledge and explanatoryknowledge is absolutely central in <str<strong>on</strong>g>Aristotle</str<strong>on</strong>g>. But it is particularly importantto recognize what capacities for knowledge he thinks are capacities forexplanatory knowledge, and especially what capacities he thinks are notcapacities for explanatory knowledge. For he argues that neither sensepercepti<strong>on</strong> (aisthēsis) nor experience (empeiria) are capacities forexplanatory knowledge.By ‘sense percepti<strong>on</strong>’ (aisthēsis), he means the capacity for knowledgeassociated with the senses—sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste—botheach sense in isolati<strong>on</strong> and the senses taken together. By ‘experience’(empeiria) he means a particular capacity for knowledge, which isgenerated from sense percepti<strong>on</strong> and memory:But from memory is generated experience in human beings [but hehas just said that other animals also possess experience, though to alimited extent]. For many memories of the same thing produce thecapacity for a single experience [of that thing].(I. 1, 980 b 28–981 a 1)

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