Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

10 ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICSintroduces this distinction in IV. 2, but it becomes prominent in booksVII–IX, the central books of the Metaphysics. We will consider thisdistinction at length later (in Chapters 4§§1–3 and 7§§1 and 4), but it isimportant to draw attention to it straight away. <strong>Aristotle</strong> introduces thisdistinction in order to address the basic question of metaphysics, ‘What isbeing?’ and ‘What is it for something to be?’ For he argues that in order toaddress the question, ‘What is being?’ and ‘What is it for something tobe?’, we need to address the question, ‘What is primary being?’ and ‘Whatis it for something to be in the primary way?’ In particular, he argues thatif we want to search for what being is and what it is for something to be, wemust do so by searching for what primary being is and what it is forsomething to be in the primary way.This argument, which concludes that we can search for what being is onlyby searching for what primary being is, serves to introduce the notion,primary being (prōtē ousia, often simply ousia), and to introduce thedistinction between being in general (to on) and primary being. Thisnotion, primary being, and the distinction between being in general andprimary being, will become absolutely central in the Metaphysics. For inthe central books of the Metaphysics, books VII–IX, <strong>Aristotle</strong> will searchfor an answer to the basic question of metaphysics, ‘What is being?’, andhe will eventually offer an answer, precisely by searching for, andeventually offering an answer to, the question, ‘What is primary being?’Let us briefly anticipate the argument for the conclusion that we can searchfor what being is only by searching for what primary being is (for the fullargument, and the full account of the notion, primary being, see below,Chapter 4§§1–3).It will emerge that the basic question of metaphysics, ‘What is being?’and ‘What is it for something, anything, to be?’, gives rise to a fundamentalaporia about the very possibility of metaphysics: how is it possible even toconceive of being, in general and as a whole, and meaningfully to ask, ‘Whatis it for something, anything, to be?’? <strong>Aristotle</strong> will raise this aporia in bookIII, the book of aporiai (see the third aporia, 997 a 15–25, and part of theseventh aporia, 998 b 22–27). Summarily, the aporia is this: we cannotconceive of being by distinguishing it from not-being, but neither can weconceive of being as the sum of all the kinds of beings that there are. So,apparently, we cannot conceive of being at all, either by distinguishing itfrom something outside it, i.e. from not-being, or by distinguishing it fromwhat is inside it, i.e. by conceiving of it as the sum of all the kinds of beingsthat there are and in general as the sum of everything that there is.It is in order to answer this aporia about the possibility of metaphysicsthat <strong>Aristotle</strong> will (in IV. 2) introduce the notion, primary being, and the