Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEING 255defined particular that it is, e.g. a particular human being, then apparentlythis identical mode of explanation is indefinitely repeatable, i.e. itintroduces the possibility of indefinitely many particulars that aredeterminate and well-defined in exactly the same way, e.g. are humanbeings.In this sense, the essence and the form of a particular material thing isprimarily a particular, but also, as a consequence, a universal. The essenceand the form is a universal in the sense that it explains universally, i.e. themode of explanation provided by the essence and the form is the exact samefor any number of particulars. Of course, if we say that the essence and theform of a particular material thing is, in this sense, a universal, i.e. in thesense that it explains universally, then we must take special care not toconfuse this with the original sense of ‘a universal’, i.e. the sense in which auniversal is something different from and true of many particulars. For theessence and the form of a particular material thing, although it explainsuniversally, is, precisely, not different from and true of the particularmaterial thing whose essence and form it is.It is of crucial importance to <strong>Aristotle</strong> that the essence and the formshould explain universally. For the essence and the form are, by their verynature, things that explain—they are principles (archai)—indeed they arethe basis of all explanation. But, for <strong>Aristotle</strong>, as also for Plato, it is part ofthe very nature of an explanation that it should explain universally, i.e.that it should explain any number of things in exactly the same way. (SeeChapter 2§3ii.)So it is not a happy coincidence that the essence and the form explainsuniversally, i.e. that the explanation of why one particular material thing,e.g. Socrates, is the very particular thing that it is—Socrates, should explainthis in exactly the same way as the explanation of why another particularmaterial thing, e.g. Plato, is the very particular thing that it is—Plato. Farfrom being a happy coincidence, this is part of the nature of explanation,and it is part of the nature of essence and form, since essence and form areexplanations and the very basis of all explanation. So it is not just a happycoincidence that things, i.e. the changing, material things with which tobegin with we are directly familiar from sense perception and experience,are in general intelligible and subject to explanation. Rather, this is part ofthe essence of things, and hence part of what it is for things to be beings,things that are, in the first place.It is worth emphasizing that <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s view thatIf something explains why a particular material thing (e.g. Socrates)is the very particular it is by explaining why it is the determinate