Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

16 ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICStwo things, one being true of the other, the former relation, i.e. the relationbetween a particular (e.g. Socrates) and its essence (e.g. being human) is arelation between a thing and itself.This also helps to clarify what <strong>Aristotle</strong> means by the essence (to ti estin,to ti ēn einai). For it shows that he argues that particulars, indeed thechanging particulars with which we are directly familiar from senseperception and experience (e.g. Socrates), have an essence, i.e. there issomething that they are simply in virtue of themselves (auta kath’ hauta).This stands in contrast especially with Plato, who argues that only universalshave an essence, and that particulars depend for their determination ontheir relation to universals. But this fundamental disagreement about whatthings have an essence takes place against the background of a sharedgeneral conception of essence: the essence, E, of a thing, x, is what x issimply in virtue of itself and in virtue of its being the very thing it is, x.Or, less formally: the essence of a thing is what we know when we knowthe answer to the question, ‘What is this very thing?’5Does <strong>Aristotle</strong> assume essentialism in the Metaphysics?Let us call ‘essentialism’ the view which says that:(1) there are things that have an essence; and(2) what the essence of a thing is does not depend on how we refer to thatthing or in general how we think or speak about it.There is no doubt that <strong>Aristotle</strong> holds this view. But does he simplyassume essentialism in the Metaphysics, or does he defend it? If he simplyassumes essentialism, then this may be a cause of concern. Indeed, we maythink that there is a particular cause of concern especially if we areimpressed by Quine’s argument against essentialism (see e.g. Quine 1953).So we may think that there is a basic cause of concern about <strong>Aristotle</strong>’sMetaphysics before we have even started looking at it.Two responses are appropriate to this cause of concern. On the onehand, even if <strong>Aristotle</strong> simply assumes essentialism in the Metaphysics,Quine’s argument against essentialism ought not to be a cause of concern.For the conception of essentialism that Quine’s argument is directedagainst is crucially different from <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s conception of essentialism. Onthe other hand, we will see that <strong>Aristotle</strong> does not simply assumeessentialism in the Metaphysics—rather he defends this view.