Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEING 231cannot, apparently, be the same thing as the ultimate subject ofpredication.Our response to the motivation for this alternative interpretation is asfollows. <strong>Aristotle</strong> may, without obvious incoherence, argue that strictly oneand the same thing is both an essence and an ultimate subject ofpredication, provided that he does not think that the essence is a universal(see Chapter 4§4 for this response). Indeed, since at the beginning (inbook III, the book of aporiai) he himself raises the question and aporiawhether principles are universal or particular (see ninth aporia, 999 b 24–1000 a 4), we must not simply assume that he thinks of essences—which, ithas emerged, are the fundamental principles— as universals. In general, itis true that the essence of a particular thing (e.g. of Socrates), i.e. theessence of an ultimate subject of predication, is that in virtue of which thething is the determinate and well-defined thing that it is (e.g. a humanbeing). But this is compatible with thinking that the essence is identicalwith the ultimate subject of predication and the particular. For <strong>Aristotle</strong>may think, and indeed he appears to argue, that the ultimate subject ofpredication and the particular is what it is, and in general it is adeterminate and well-defined thing, simply in virtue of itself.Our response to the reasoning in the alternative interpretation is asfollows. It is of course true that, in V. 8, <strong>Aristotle</strong> distinguishes two sensesof ousia (primary being): ousia in the sense of ‘the ultimate subject ofpredication’ and ousia in the sense of ‘essence’. But this is no reason at allfor thinking that it is not strictly one and the same thing that is ousia in bothsenses, i.e. that it is not strictly one and the same thing that is both anessence and an ultimate subject of predication.In general, it does not follow from the claim that a term, n, has twodifferent senses that what is strictly one and the same thing cannot at oncesatisfy both senses. On the contrary, one may think that a term, n, has twosenses, but at the same time one may argue that if something satisfies theone sense, then it (the very same thing) must also satisfy the other sense,and conversely. For example, one may think that we need to distinguishtwo senses of the term ‘human being’: ‘human being’ in the sense of athing that belongs to a certain biological species (e.g. one that has evolvedthrough a certain natural selection); and ‘human being’ in the sense of athing that possesses certain distinctive abilities (e.g. the ability to uselanguage, etc). But at the same time one may argue that if something is ahuman being in the first sense, then it (the very same thing) must also be ahuman being in the second sense, and conversely. In other words, one mayargue that only things that belong to this biological species can develop,and can possess, these distinctive abilities, and conversely.