Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

4METAPHYSICS AS THE SCIENCE OFBEING QUA BEINGPrimary being versus non-primary being (Books IV.1–2 and VI. 1)1Metaphysics as the science of being qua beingIn the opening sentence of book IV, <strong>Aristotle</strong> states how metaphysics is tobe understood: as the science of being qua being. He says that there reallyis such a science:There is a science which investigates being qua being and whatbelongs to this [i.e. to being] in virtue of itself [kath’ hauto, i.e. whatbelongs to being essentially].(l003 a 21–22)The claim that there is such a science is particularly important, for it maysuggest that <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that there is a problem about the possibility ofa science of being qua being, but also that the problem can be answered. Infact it will emerge that the claim that there is such a science, metaphysics,is the conclusion of a defence of the possibility of metaphysics, except thathe states this conclusion before he actually undertakes the defence.There is good reason to suppose that <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that there is aproblem about the very possibility of metaphysics, if we recall the aporiaiin the previous book (i.e. book III). For some of these aporiai raisedproblems precisely about the possibility of metaphysics—problemsoriginating especially in the question of how we can conceive of all beingsand of being as a whole and qua being (see especially the third aporia,997 a 15–25, and part of the seventh aporia, especially 998 a 22–27).Furthermore, we will see shortly that the opening of the next chapter inthe present book (i.e. IV. 2) is best understood as putting forward asolution to just these aporiai, and hence as defending the possibility ofmetaphysics.