Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

226 THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEINGabsurdly, what it is to be a pale thing and what it is to be a human thingare the same.But we know what <strong>Aristotle</strong> would respond. For he denies that Socratesthe pale thing is only in a loose sense the same thing as Socrates the humanthing; i.e. he denies that there are two things here that merely happen toform an aggregate and compound thing. He denies this precisely because heargues that a thing, such as Socrates, has only one essence, not indefinitelymany essences or as many essences as it has properties. For if Socrates thepale thing were only in a loose sense the same thing as Socrates the humanthing, i.e. if there were two things here that merely happened to form anaggregate and compound thing, then the thing that we call by one name,‘Socrates’, would really be indefinitely many things: Socrates the pale thing,Socrates the human thing, etc. So it would have indefinitely manyessences, i.e. as many essences as it has properties (see §5iii of this chapter).So we can now see why <strong>Aristotle</strong> limits the claim that each thing isidentical with its essence to things that strictly have an essence and areprimary beings; i.e. to things that are the very things they are, and indeedare beings, simply in virtue of themselves (ta kath’ hauta legomena). Forsuppose that a thing such as Socrates the pale thing was identical with itsessence, i.e. with what it is to be a pale thing, and likewise with Socratesthe human thing, etc. In general, suppose that the claim that each thing isidentical with its essence was not limited to some things, but was intendedto be true of all things. Then it would follow that, absurdly, what it is tobe a pale thing and what it is to be a human thing are the same. Thiswould follow unless Socrates were merely an aggregate and compoundthing that is made up of indefinitely many things, i.e. of Socrates the palething, Socrates the human thing, etc. So, in order to ensure that Socrates isnot merely an aggregate of indefinitely many things, and at same time toensure that there is something with regard to Socrates that is identical withhis essence, <strong>Aristotle</strong> argues that just one of the things that Socrates is isidentical with his essence. This one thing that Socrates is and that isidentical with his essence is, precisely, the ultimate subject of predicationwith regard to Socrates. For the ultimate subject of predication with regardto Socrates is just one thing, not indefinitely many things. And each of thethings that are different from and true of this subject, e.g. being pale, snubnosed,five foot tall, etc, are things that are true of Socrates not in virtue ofhimself (kath’ hauton), but only in virtue of his relation to these things orproperties. <strong>Aristotle</strong> also calls the things that Socrates is in virtue of hishaving such properties, e.g. Socrates the pale thing, the snub-nosed thing,etc., ‘the things that are said [i.e. said to be] by accident’ or ‘bycircumstance’ (ta legomena kata sumbebēkos, 1031 a 19). For it is only by