Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

78 ARISTOTLE’S METHOD IN METAPHYSICSTo us, the idea that it is the things themselves that generate aporiai mayappear very puzzling. After all, things do not literally ask questions. But,setting aside the potent metaphor of there being ‘knots in things’, what<strong>Aristotle</strong> appears to mean is this: engaging with aporiai may be essential tounderstanding certain things (although not all things), and it may beessential because of the nature of those things, rather than because ofconfusions in our thinking or inadequacies in our knowledge. If we stillfind puzzling the idea that it may be the things, rather than simply ourthinking, that generate aporiai, we may reformulate this idea as follows:engaging with aporiai may be essential to our understanding certain things(although not all things), and it may be essential to our understanding ofcertain things, irrespective or how clear our thinking may be or howgenerally adequate our knowledge may be. It is arguably in this sense thatthe things themselves are supposed to generate aporiai.There is real attraction in <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s aporia-based method inmetaphysics. <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks of metaphysics as a fundamental inquiry: a‘first philosophy’ and ‘first science’. But what entitles him to this view?How can he be confident that metaphysics does not rely on certainunacknowledged presuppositions ? For example, how can he be confidentthat it does not rely on semantic or epistemological presuppositions? Thisquestion has, of course, become the bugbear of modern metaphysics, atleast since Kant. So how in general can he engage in a metaphysical inquirywithout begging any questions, i.e. without presupposing claims that canthemselves be contested—whether these questions are metaphysical orabout the very possibility of metaphysics? But it seems clear and strikingthat if any method has a chance of being presuppositionless and notquestion-begging, and if any method has a chance of providing for agenuinely fundamental inquiry—a first philosophy and first science—thanit is an aporia-based method. For to start with aporiai is to start fromquestions, not claims. Moreover, the questions may even include thequestion of how the search at hand is possible. For example, we will seethat some of <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s metaphysical aporiai in book III are directly aboutthe very possibility of metaphysics (see aporiai 1–4, and 7). So if wegenuinely start from questions, we can perhaps avoid begging any questions;and since metaphysics is supposed to be a fundamental inquiry—a firstphilosophy and first science—it is crucial that it should aspire to beingpresuppositionless and not question-begging.