Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

THE ULTIMATE EXPLANATIONS OF ALL THINGS 39kinds of explanations and causes of things, and in particular of changingthings: the formal cause; the material cause; the efficient cause; and thefinal cause. But it is important to note why he mentions the theory of thefour causes here:for we say that we know each thing precisely when we suppose thatwe know its first explanation [or ‘its first cause’, prōtē aitia].(I. 3, 983 a 25–26)So he thinks that knowledge, at its best, requires knowledge of explanations;and ultimately it requires knowledge of first, i.e. ultimate, explanations.This is also a reminder of the theory of explanatory knowledge that hedeveloped in the Posterior Analytics. So let us stand back from the text ofthe Metaphysics and consider <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s general conception of explanatoryknowledge, or science (epistēmē). We will begin with his account of whatit is to search for explanations, and what this search is based on.At the opening of the Physics, <strong>Aristotle</strong> characterizes the search forexplanations as a ‘path’ or ‘road’ (hodos) that we take up:from what is better known and more clear to us, towards what isbetter known and more clear on account of [its] nature [tēi phusei],(Physics I. 1, 184 a 16–18)Here he also refers to ‘what is better known and more clear on account of[its] nature’ as ‘what is better known and more clear without qualification(haplōs)’. In the Posterior Analytics (71 b 29–72 a 5) he makes the same point,but he also clarifies that:By what is more basic [proteron, ‘prior’, ‘more primary’] and betterknown to us I mean what is closer to sense perception; and by whatis more basic and better known without qualification [i.e. on accountof its nature] I mean what is further removed from senseperception. But it is the things that are most universal that arefurthest removed from sense perception; and it is particulars that areclosest to sense perception.(Posterior Analytics I. 2, 72 a 1–5)So, when we search for explanations, we must start from something that isalready clear or evident (safes) to our senses, for example that plants grow.And it is of such evident things that we may go on to ask: why are thesethings as they are (or as they appear to our senses)? For example: why do