Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

158 PHENOMENALISM AND RELATIVISMknowledge (or, alternatively, all meaning) is based in and constructed outof appearances, i.e. how things directly appear to our senses.Indeed, there is a very important difference between using the term‘phenomenalism’ to mean that all appearances and all beliefs are true, andusing this term in its more modern epistemological or semantic senses. Forwe will see that the view that all appearances and all beliefs are true directlyentails a radical denial of the principle of non-contradiction. (<strong>Aristotle</strong>carefully argues for this point at the opening of IV. 5.) But phenomenalismin the modern senses of the term is usually thought to be perfectlycompatible with the truth of PNC. <strong>Aristotle</strong> tends to associate the firstview with Protagoras, and the second with Heracleitus; so we might simplyuse these names as labels for these views. But this would be misleading andconfusing. For we, if anything, are accustomed to associate the name ofProtagoras with relativism, not with phenomenalism in the above sense.Indeed, the direct association of Protagoras with relativism goes back toPlato’s dialogue, the Theaetetus, a dialogue to which <strong>Aristotle</strong> refers here(see 1010 b 11–14) and which is very much in the background of hispresent investigation (i.e. in IV. 5–6). This suggests that he is not so muchconcerned with who exactly held these two views, or how they held them;he is, we will see, rather concerned with arguing that these two views,phenomenalism and relativism, are the root source of the denial of PNC.We will return at length to <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s diagnosis of the source of the denialof PNC.But what is <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s aim in considering phenomenalism and relativismhere (in IV. 5–6), and why does he consider these views at all? It willemerge that he is not so much concerned with these views in their ownright, and neither is it his aim directly to argue against them. Rather, he isconcerned with phenomenalism and relativism because they present aserious challenge to his defence of PNC and to his defence of the view thatthings are determinate and well-defined (i.e. the defence that he developedin IV. 3–4, which we considered in the previous chapter). So his responseto phenomenalism and relativism must be understood as a central part of hisdefence of PNC.We may recall that <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s defence of PNC (especially in IV. 4) wasbasically this:(P1) Only if PNC is true of things can we think and speak aboutthings;but evidently,(P2) We can think and speak about things;Therefore,