Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

168 PHENOMENALISM AND RELATIVISMWe must show to them and convince them [i.e. the phenomenalistsand those who defend this radical view about change] that there is anature that is changeless [akinētos tis phusis].(1010 a 33–35)So <strong>Aristotle</strong> himself points out that it is not adequate simply to state hisopposing account of change; rather, this account must itself be defended,and especially its most central claim must be defended, i.e. thecommitment to something changeless. (It is plausible to think that here heis referring to his general view that changeless things are changeless inrespect of their form. But he may also be referring to his more specific viewthat there is an absolutely primary being—a divine being, God—which isthe ultimate explanation of all intelligible change, and that this absolutelyprimary being is in every respect changeless.) He does not undertake thisdefence here (in IV. 5–6), i.e. the defence of the claim that there arechangeless things; rather this defence is a central part of the Metaphysics asa whole (especially books VII-IX and XII).This suggests that there is an important programmatic and anticipatoryside to his response to phenomenalism and relativism, and in general to hisresponse to the denial of PNC and especially PNC-M. He wants to set outa programme of systematically developing an account of the nature ofthings in such a way that there is something fundamentally changelessabout changing things; for he wants to argue that only if there issomething fundamentally changeless about changing things can changingthings be not radically indeterminate, but determinate and well-defined.So, far from its being his aim in a few lines to refute phenomenalism,relativism and other views that lead to the denial of PNC and PNC-M, hethinks rather that an adequate response is really the task of metaphysics—and the Metaphysics—in general. In other words, the quick objections tophenomenalism, relativism and to other views that lead to the denial ofPNC and PNC-M, which may at first strike us as question-begging anddogmatic, are best understood as programmatic and anticipatory. Theseobjections set out an overall task, and they anticipate how, in broadoutline, this task is to be carried out and what overall conclusions it isdirected towards.So it appears that <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s aim here (in IV. 5–6) is not directly to argueagainst phenomenalism and relativism, but rather to trace the source of thedenial of PNC and especially PNC-M. For he will argue that this sourcecan be traced back to phenomenalism, relativism and further back tocertain other views. (We will consider this argument in the followingsection.) But how can such a diagnostic examination contribute to the