Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

THE ULTIMATE CAUSE OF CHANGE: GOD 285identifies it with God, since these characteristics, he says, are commonlyassociated with God:For we say that God is an everlasting and perfect living being, sothat life and continuous and everlasting duration belong to God; forthis is God.(XII. 7,1072 b 28–30)But the activity of the ultimate cause of change is not just any activity, butthe best activity, namely, rational thought (noēsis, the activity of nous,reason); and this activity is a form of life, indeed the best life (1072 a 26–28). So the activity of the ultimate cause of change consists of rationalthought.<strong>Aristotle</strong> goes on (in XII. 9) to argue that what the ultimate cause ofchange thinks is, precisely, what is best—and this is nothing but itself. Sothe ultimate cause of change—God, thinks nothing but itself:Therefore, it [nous, i.e. the rational intellect that is the ultimatecause of change] thinks itself, since it is what is most excellent; andthis thinking is the thinking of thinking.(XII. 9, 1074 b 33–35; see also XII. 7, 1072 b 18–20)So the activity of the ultimate cause of change consists in the rationalthought that has as its object nothing but itself—rational thought. It isnaturally some task for us to follow <strong>Aristotle</strong> here.Let us begin with the view that the ultimate cause of change must beactive, setting aside for a moment what the activity is supposed to be. Whymust the ultimate cause of change be active? <strong>Aristotle</strong> emphasizes from thestart that the ultimate cause of change must be active; otherwise, he says, itcannot cause and explain the activity and motion of the cosmos:But if there is a moving and productive principle [i.e. the ultimatecause of change], but one that is not active, still there will be nomotion…. Nothing, then, is gained even if we postulate everlastingousiai in the manner of those who believe in the forms [i.e. Plato andthe Platonists], unless there is contained in them a principle whichcan cause change. But even this is not enough, nor postulating someother ousia besides the forms (para ta eidē). For if this is not inactivity, still there will be no motion.(XII. 6, 1071 b 12–17)