Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

262 THE ULTIMATE CAUSE OF CHANGE: GODbooks (especially VII. 1–2; see Chapter 7§1). At the opening of theMetaphysics, metaphysics was characterized as the search for the ultimateexplanations of all things, with the emphasis on all things. And early in thecentral books (in book VII) metaphysics was characterized as the search forprimary being (ousia). Indeed, in book VII primary being was in generalcharacterized as separate being (chōriston) and set against non-primary andnon-separate being (see VII. 1, 1028 a 33–34; discussed in Chapter 7§4);but this is precisely how primary being is characterized here (XII, 1069 a 24,also a 20–21). Furthermore, it is emphasized here (XII. 1, 1069 a 25–30)that this search is as old as the trees and is shared by different and variousphilosophers; but this was likewise emphasized in book VII (see VII. 1,1028 b 2f. and VII. 2).So the project of book XII is to search for the ultimate explanation of allthings, and in particular of nature and the universe as a whole. The aim iseventually (in XII. 6–10) to argue that there is a single explanation of theregular and uniform change that is distinctive of nature as a whole, andthat this explanation is provided by something that is itself changeless anddistinct from nature as a whole—by God. But apparently this project, as<strong>Aristotle</strong> characterizes it (especially in XII. 1), is very much part of theproject of the Metaphysics. It is important to note this, not least becausethere is, on the other hand, also reason to think that book XII was writtenas a largely self-contained piece which can, at least to a large extent, standon its own, and was only later inserted as book XII of the Metaphysics.But there is an important complication. We recall that, earlier in theMetaphysics, metaphysics was characterized in three ways:(1) as the science of all things (I. 1–2);(2) as the science of being qua being (in IV. 1); and(3) as the science of primary being (in IV. 2 and books VII–IX).We have seen that two of these three characterizations are also directlypresent in book XII. 1: the science of all things and indeed of the universeas a whole (see 1069 a 19), and the science of primary being (ousia,characterized in exactly the same way as in book VII). But the thirdcharacterization appears to be conspicuously missing from book XII:the science of being qua being, i.e. the search for an answer to the basicquestion of metaphysics: ‘What is being and what is it for something,anything, to be?’ So we must ask, is the project in book XII at all intendedto contribute to this basic question of metaphysics ? There is reason tothink that it is. The main reason is that it is hard to understand thequestion, ‘What is primary being?’, which (in XII. 1) is part of the