Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

ARISTOTLE’S METHOD IN METAPHYSICS 752The source of the aporiai in metaphysicsIn book III, <strong>Aristotle</strong> lists some fifteen aporiai in and about metaphysics,which it is his aim to engage with and eventually to answer. But before welook at the individual aporiai, it is natural to ask, where does he get themfrom and what is their source? An answer that immediately suggests itself isthat he gets them from his predecessors and especially from conflicts ofopinion among his predecessors (including, of course, Plato). So we mightexpect that in each of these aporiai and dilemmas, each side of thedilemma represents an opinion of an earlier thinker, and, that when<strong>Aristotle</strong> presents a dilemma, it is such conflicts of opinions that hepresents. This would mean that when <strong>Aristotle</strong> engages with these aporiaiwhat he is doing is engaging in dialogue with those earlier thinkers who, inhis view, have addressed the subject of the nature of being. So it willemerge that the aporia-based method is a variation of a dialectical approach(from dialegesthai, ‘to converse’ or ‘discuss’). If the aporia-based method isindeed a variation of the dialectical approach, it will, arguably, be avariation of the so-called endoxic approach (from endoxon, ‘a reputableopinion’). For <strong>Aristotle</strong> will not want to engage equally with just anyopinion, but rather with reputable opinions (endoxa). In general, endoxaare opinions that enjoy at least prima facie credibility either because theyare generally shared or because they are held by ‘the wise’, i.e. those whohave given proper thought to the matter (see Topics I for <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s appealto endoxa in this sense; see e.g. Nicomachean Ethics VII. 1, 1145 b 1ff. for anapproach that appeals centrally to such endoxa). So, on this interpretationof <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s method, the aporia-based method is a variation of adialectical and endoxic approach; i.e. it is a dialogue with earlier thinkersand in particular a discussion of reputable opinions (endoxa) obtained fromthem.There is evidently something broadly right about this interpretation.For it is true that in some of the aporiai that he lists in book III we may beable to associate each side of the dilemma with the opinion of an earlierthinker (in some cases this will be Plato, who is only recently dead andwhom <strong>Aristotle</strong> of course knew personally and as a friend). It is also truethat <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that all searching for knowledge starts from so-calledphainomena: things that are apparent to us. But phainomena may naturallygenerate reputable opinions. This may suggest that the aporia-basedmethod which he adopts in metaphysics is simply a variation of adialectical and endoxic approach. In that case, metaphysics is anengagement with reputable opinions about the nature of being.