Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

102 BEING QUA BEING AND PRIMARY BEINGAlternative interpretationThere is an alternative, and very common, interpretation of why <strong>Aristotle</strong>introduces the distinction between primary and non-primary being in IV.2 (see, for example, Bolton 1996). On this interpretation, he introducesthis distinction because he is already committed to a particular view aboutwhat things are primary beings and what things are non-primary beings.For, in the earlier work, the Categories, he argued that there are twofundamentally different kinds of beings: beings that are true of other beingsand beings that are not true of other beings. (For example, being snubnosedor being human are things that are true of other things, e.g. ofSocrates; but a particular thing such as Socrates is not true of other things.)But he also argued, in the Categories, that the beings that are not true ofother beings are primary beings, whereas the beings that are true of otherbeings are dependent on the beings of which they are true, i.e. on theprimary beings. (We will consider the theory of the Categories in §4 of thischapter.) So, on this interpretation, the reason why he introduces thedistinction between primary being and non-primary being in IV. 2 is thathe is already committed to a particular view about what things are primarybeings and what things are non-primary beings.But there are problems with this interpretation. First, as we haveunderstood <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s introduction of the distinction between primarybeing and non-primary being in IV. 2, this distinction is entirely generaland it does not commit one to any view about what things are primarybeings and what things are non-primary beings. This accords with the wayin which he proceeds later (especially in book VII); for in book VII he asks‘What is primary being?’, and he points out that this question can beanswered in very different and apparently conflicting ways (see opening ofVII. 3; we will return to this important point later). But only one of thedifferent possible answers that he distinguishes in VII. 3 is the answer thathe defended in the Categories. Moreover, we will see that it is not clear thathe will defend the same answer in the Metaphysics. So it is not plausible tothink that the way in which he distinguishes between primary being andnon-primary being in IV. 2, i.e. when he first introduces this distinction inthe Metaphysics, is supposed straight away to be understood in terms of theview of the Categories.Second, we have seen that the way in which <strong>Aristotle</strong> characterizesmetaphysics in IV. 1 gives rise to a problem and aporia about thepossibility of metaphysics, an aporia which he himself raised in book III,the book of aporiai; and that the general distinction between primarybeing and non-primary being which he introduces in IV. 2 is naturally