Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEING 235essence of a changing, material thing is, precisely, its form. To illustrate theproblem further, suppose that we conceive of the form of a material thingas something like the shape or arrangement of that thing, and in particularas the shape or arrangement of its matter. Then it is natural to think thatthe process of generation of a particular material thing of a certain shapeand arrangement involves a process of generation of a certain particularshape and arrangement, i.e. the shape and arrangement of the particularthing that is generated. Indeed, we may even think, quite naturally, that insome cases we can literally see the generation not only of the particularmaterial thing, but also of its shape and arrangement, its form. So there isnothing obvious about the view that the form of a changing, materialthing, i.e. a thing which is subject to generation and destruction, is not itselfsubject to generation and destruction.It is worth noting that this is a problem for <strong>Aristotle</strong>, who argues that theessence of a changing, material thing is inseparable from that thing. It isnot a problem for Plato, who argues that essences and forms are separableand distinct from changing, material things. This also indicates why here(in VII. 7–9) he not only argues that the form of a changing, materialthing is changeless and free from generation and destrction, but also arguesagainst Plato’s view that the form of a changing, material thing issomething distinct from (para) that thing (see VII. 8, 1033 b 19ff.)<strong>Aristotle</strong> argues (especially in VII. 8) that the process of generation of aparticular material thing (e.g. Socrates, when Socrates is generated in hismother’s womb) does not involve a process of generation of the form ofthat thing. He concludes that the form of a changing, material thing is notsubject to generation and destruction, and in general it is changeless.Evidently, the process of generation of a particular material thing involveschange and something changing. In general, <strong>Aristotle</strong> argues that itinvolves something changing into something else, i.e. the matter changinginto a generated material thing (e.g. into Socrates; for this argument ingeneral, see Chapter 2§4i and ii). In other words, he argues that thegeneration of a particular material thing must be understood as thegeneration of something, i.e. the particular material thing, out of something(ek tinos), i.e, out of its matter. He also recalls this argument at the openingof both VII. 7 and VII. 8. But what he argues here (especially in VII. 8,1033 a 24– b 16) is that, in the process of generation of a particular materialthing of a certain form, e.g. of a particular human being, Socrates, thematter is the only thing that is involved in change; the form is not itselfinvolved in change. So, for a particular material thing of a certain form,e.g. a particular human being, Socrates, to be generated is for some matterto become a particular material thing of that form. But <strong>Aristotle</strong> argues that