Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

THE ULTIMATE CAUSE OF CHANGE: GOD 265Evidently, he also has in mind the first sense of separation, i.e. ontologicalindependence. For he argues that every primary being, whether it isprimary being with regard to nature as a whole or it is primary being withregard to each particular thing within nature (e.g. with regard to Socrates),is separate in this sense (see XII. 1, 1069 a 19–24; also VII. 1, 1028 a 33–34).This is because it is part of the very notion of primary being (prōtē ousia,often simply ousia) that a primary being is a being simply in virtue of itselfand not in virtue of its relation to other things. But this cannot be all thathe has in mind when he says that the ultimate explanation of nature as awhole is separate. For when he uses the term ‘separate’ of this ultimateexplanation and this absolutely primary being, just as when he uses‘changeless’ of it, he wants to set this ultimate explanation and thisabsolutely primary being against any other primary being, i.e. to set itagainst primary beings with regard to any particular thing within nature(e.g. with regard to Socrates). For he argues, precisely, that primary beingwith regard to any particular thing within nature (e.g. Socrates or Kallias)is not separate, or distinct (para), from the particular thing with regard towhich it is primary being (e.g. Socrates or Kallias, see XII. 3, 1070 a 13–14).So when he argues that the ultimate explanation of nature as a whole isseparate, he appears to have in mind also, and especially, the second senseof separation, i.e. distinctness. Perhaps he also has in mind the third sense,i.e. separable existence.2Changing, changeless and transcendent thingsLike Plato, <strong>Aristotle</strong> distinguishes two fundamental kinds of things:changing things, which are material, and changeless things, which are notmaterial. Like Plato again, he argues that we are familiar from senseperception and experience with changing things, i.e. they are senseperceptiblethings (aisthēta), while we grasp changeless things through ourintellect and reason, i.e. they are intelligible things (noēta, see XII. 1,1069 a 30–34). Whatwegrasp through reason is, above all, that there mustbe changeless things, if explanation is to be at all possible and if things areto be at all subject to explanation. Further, we can then search forexplanations, which are based in changeless things, and this search willinvolve a combination of, on the one hand, sense perception andexperience and, on the other hand, reasoning.So <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s metaphysics has the following structure:Here it is worth recalling that, for <strong>Aristotle</strong>, matter is part of theexplanation of change, so changing things are necessarily material things,