Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

and [2b] the genus are thought to be primary being with regard toeach thing, and also, fourthly, [3] that which underlies these.(VII. 3, 1028 b 33–36)The genus of a thing is itself a universal: it is the most general kind towhich the thing belongs. So we may here ignore the distinction betweenuniversals that are genera and universals in general, and we may considerthe two under the single heading, i.e. the universals. We may also notethat in the book of aporiai, book III, <strong>Aristotle</strong> himself distinguishes themost general question, whether primary being is the universals (see thefifteenth aporia, 1003 a 5–17), from the more particular questions: whetherprimary being is the kinds to which a thing belongs and, if so, how generalthese kinds will be (see the sixth and seventh aporiai, 998 a 20–999 a 23).Apparently, <strong>Aristotle</strong> introduces this candidate for primary being, i.e.the universals, because he has just mentioned (in VII. 2) that certainthinkers, i.e. Plato and the Platonists, argue that primary being is thechangeless forms, which exist ‘apart from’ or ‘besides’ or ‘over and above’(para) sense-perceptible and in general changing things; i.e. they existdistinct from changing things. But, in general, Plato’s forms, certainly as<strong>Aristotle</strong> understands them, are universals, i.e. things that are true of otherthings and of many things. For example, the one thing, being human, istrue of other things and of many things: Socrates, Plato, etc. So we mayassociate the view that primary being is the universals with Plato and thePlatonists, as <strong>Aristotle</strong> understands them. And we may associate the viewthat primary being is simply the ultimate subject of predication with hisown earlier view, in the Categories (see Chapter 4§4, for this view). Theview that primary being is the essence is the view that he will defend here,in the central books of the Metaphysics. But he will argue that the essence,once it has been properly understood, is identical with the ultimate subjectof predication, once it has been properly understood.So these, it emerges, are the main candidates for primary being:(1) the ultimate subject of predication;(2) the universals; and(3) the essence.THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEING 199Can we perhaps stand back and in some way see why <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks thatjust these are the main candidates for primary being? An attempt to do sois offered in Chapter 1§4.