Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

it tends and has an inclination to the centre, but in reality
tendency and will can only be imagined in connexion with
knowledge and an object desired and these can only be
imagined in animals.
I say:
If by ‘agent’ or ‘tendency’ or ‘willing’ is meant the performance of an act
of a willer, it is a metaphor, but when by these expressions is meant that it
actualizes another’s potency, it is really an agent in the full meaning of the
word.
Ghazali then says:
I say:
When the philosophers say that the term ‘act’ is a genus
which is subdivided into ‘natural act’ and ‘voluntary act’, this
cannot he conceded; it is as if one were to say that ‘willing’ is
a genus which is subdivided into willing accompanied by
knowledge of the object willed, and willing without
knowledge of the object willed. This is wrong, because will
necessarily implies knowledge, and likewise act necessarily
implies will.
The assertion of the philosophers that ‘agent’ is subdivided into
‘voluntary’ and ‘non-voluntary agent’ is true, but the comparison with a
division of will into rational and irrational is false, because in the definition
of will knowledge is included, so that the division has no sense. But in the
definition of ‘act’ knowledge is not included, because actualization of
another thing is possible without knowing it. This is clear, and therefore
the wise say that God’s word: ‘a wall which wanted to fall to pieces” is a
metaphor.
Ghazali proceeds:
When you affirm that your expression ‘natural act’ is not a
contradiction in terms you are wrong; there is as a matter of
fact a contradiction when ‘natural act’ is taken in a real
sense, only this contradiction is not at once evident to the
understanding nor is the incompatibility of nature and act felt
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