Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

its perception of another is different in a certain way from the perception of
itself. Still, our intellect has a resemblance to yonder intellect, and it is
yonder intellect which gives our intellect this resemblance, for the
intelligibles which are in yonder intellect are free from the imperfections
which are in our intellect: for instance, our intellect only becomes the
intelligible in so far as it is an intelligible, because there exists an intellect
which is the intelligible in every respect. The reason for this is that
everything which possesses an imperfect attribute possesses this attribute
necessarily through a being which possesses it in a perfect way. For
instance, that which possesses an insufficient warmth possesses this
through a thing which possesses a perfect warmth, and likewise that
which possesses an insufficient life or an imperfect intellect possesses this
through a thing which possesses a perfect life or a perfect intellect. ‘ And
in the same way a thing which possesses a perfect rational act receives
this act from a perfect intellect, and if the acts of all beings, although they
do not possess intellects, are perfect rational acts, then there exists an
intellect through which the acts of all beings become rational acts.
It is weak thinkers who, not having understood this, ask whether the
First Principle thinks its own essence or if it thinks something outside its
essence. But to assume that it thinks something outside its essence would
imply that it is perfected by another thing, and to assume that it does not
think something outside its essence would imply that it is ignorant of
existents. One can only wonder at these people who remove from the
attributes which are common to the Creator and the created, all the
imperfections which they possess in the created, and who still make our
intellect like His intellect, whereas nothing is more truly free from all
imperfection than His intellect. This suffices for the present chapter, but
now let us relate the other arguments of Ghazali in this chapter and call
attention to the mistakes in them.
Ghazali says:
The second way to answer this assertion is to say that
their expression that everything is known to it in second
intention is without sense, for as soon as its knowledge
comprehends a thing different from itself, in the way it
comprehends its own essence, this First Principle will have
two different objects of knowledge and it will know them
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