Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

I say:
not possible, and your statement that body cannot be
necessary is pure presumption without any foundation.
We have already said that if by ‘necessary existent’ is understood the
causeless and by ‘possible existent’ is understood that which has a cause,
the division of being into these two sections is not acknowledged, and
opponents might say that this division is not true, but that, indeed, all
existents are causeless. But when by ‘necessary existent’ is understood
absolute necessary being and by ‘possible’ the genuinely possible, then
we must arrive at a being which has no cause, for we can say that every
being is either possible or necessary; if possible, it has a cause, and if this
cause is of the nature of the possible, we have a series which ends in a
necessary cause. Then, concerning this necessary cause it may be asked
again whether some necessary beings might have a cause and other
necessary beings none, and if a cause is ascribed to the nature of the
necessary being which can have a cause, there will follow a series which
ends in a necessary being which has no cause. Avicenna wanted by this
division only to conform to the opinion of the philosophers concerning
existents, for all philosophers agree that the body of the heavens is
necessary through something else; whether, however, this thing
necessary through another is possible by itself is a problem which has to
be studied. And this argument is therefore faulty when this method is
followed, and this method is of necessity faulty, because being is not
primarily divided into the genuinely possible and the necessary, for this is
a division which is only known through the nature of existing things.
Then Ghazali answers the philosophers’ statement that body cannot be
a necessary existent by itself, because it has parts which are its cause.
If it is said: ‘It cannot be denied that body has parts, and
that the whole is only constituted through the parts, and that
the parts in a thing are prior to the whole, ‘ we answer: ‘Let it
be so; certainly, the whole is constituted by the parts and
their aggregation, but there is no cause for the parts nor for
their aggregation, which on the contrary are eternally in the
condition in which they are without an efficient cause. ‘ And
the philosophers cannot refute this, except by the argument
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