Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

particular perceptions; that is, they are an intermediary between the
definition of a things and its particular representation . But if the heavenly
bodies have representations, then they must have representations that are
of the nature of the universal, not of the nature of the particular
representation which is acquired through the senses. And it is not possible
that our acts should proceed from particular representations, and therefore
the philosophers believe that the represented forms from which the
definite acts of animals proceed are like an intermediary between the
intelligibles and the individual forms represented, e. g. the form by reason
of which non-carnivorous birds flee from birds of prey, and the form by
reason of which bees build their cells. ? The only artisan who needs an
individual sensible image is the one who does not possess this universal
representation, which is necessary for the origination of the individual
things. e
It is this universal image which is the motive power for the universal will
which does not aim at a particular individual; and it is the individual will
which aims at a particular individual of one and the same species-this,
however, does not happen in the heavenly bodies.
And that a universal will should exist for a universal thing in so far as it is
universal is impossible, since the universal does not exist outside the soul
and has no transitory existence. And his primary division of will into a
universal and an individual will is, indeed, not correct; otherwise one must
say that the heavenly bodies move towards the definite limits of things
without the definite limit being accompanied by the representation of an
individual existent, in contrast to what happens with us. And his assertion
that no individual is realized through the universal will is false, if by
‘universal will’ is understood that which does not distinguish one individual
from another, but represents it universally, as is the case with a king who
arranges his armies for battle. ‘ If, however, there is understood by ‘will’ its
being attached to a universal entity itself, then it must be said that such an
attachment is not a will at all, and there does not exist such a will except in
the way we have explained .
And if it followed from the nature of the heavenly bodies that they think
sublunary things by way of imagination, they must do this through
universal imaginations which are the results of definition, not through
particular imaginations which are the results of senseimpressions. And it
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