Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

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I say:essence and a quiddity, differing from it in having a cause,whereas the First is causeless. And why should such aneffect not be imagined? And is there any other reason forthis than that it is inconceivable in itself? But what isinconceivable in itself does not become conceivable by thedenial of its cause, nor does what is conceivable becomeinconceivable because it is supposed to have a cause. Suchan extreme negation is the most obscure of their theories,although they believe indeed that they have proved whatthey say. Their doctrine ends in absolute negation, andindeed the denial of the quiddity is the denial of the realessence, and through the denial of this reality nothingremains but the word ‘existence’, which has no object at allwhen it is not related to a quiddity. ‘And if it is said: ‘Its real essence is that it is thenecessary, and the necessary is its quiddity’, we answer:‘The only sense of “necessary” is “causeless”, and this is anegation which does not constitute a real essence; and thedenial of a cause for the real essence presupposes the realessence, and therefore let the essence be conceivable, sothat it can be described as being causeless; but the essencecannot be represented as non-existent, since “necessity” hasno other meaning than “being causeless”. ‘ Besides, if thenecessity were added to the existence, this would form aplurality; and if it is not added, how then could it be thequiddity? For the existence is not the quiddity, and thus whatis not added to the existence cannot be the quiddity either. ‘This whole paragraph is sophistry. For the philosophers do not assumethat the First has an existence without a quiddity and a quiddity without anexistence. They believe only that the existence in the compound is anadditional attribute to its essence and it only acquires this attribute throughthe agent, and they believe that in that which is simple and causeless thisattribute is not additional to the quiddity and that it has no quidditydifferentiated from its existence; but they do not say that it has absolutelyno quiddity, as he assumes in his objection against them.318
Having assumed that they deny the quiddity-which is false Ghazalibegins now to charge them with reprehensible theories and says:I say:If this were conceivable it would also be possible in theeffects that there should be an existence without anessence, participating with the First in not having a realessence.But the philosophers do not assume an existent absolutely without aquiddity: they only assume that it has not a quiddity like the quiddities ofthe other existents; and this is one of the sophistical fallacies, for the term‘quiddity’ is ambiguous, and this assumption, and everything built upon it,is a sophistical argument, for the non-existent cannot be described eitherby denying or by affirming something of it. And Ghazali, by fallacies of thekind perpetrated in this book, is not exempt from wickedness or fromignorance, and he seems nearer to wickedness than to ignorance-orshould we say that there is a necessity which obliged him to do this?And as to his remark, that the meaning of ‘necessary existent’ is ,causeless’, this is not true, but our expression that it is a necessaryexistent has a positive meaning, consequent on a nature which hasabsolutely no cause, no exterior agent, and no agent which is part of it.And as to Ghazali’s words:I say:If the necessity were added to the existence, this wouldform a plurality; and if it is not added, how then could it bethe quiddity? For existence is not the quiddity, and thus whatis not added to the existence cannot be the quiddity either.According to the philosophers necessity is not an attribute added to theessence, and it is predicated of the essence in the same way as we say ofit that it is inevitable and eternal. ‘ And likewise if we understand by‘existence’ a mental attribute, it is not an addition to the essence, but if weunderstand it as being an accident, in the way Avicenna regards it in thecomposite existent, then it becomes difficult to explain how theuncompounded can be the quiddity itself, although one might say319
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TAHAFUT AL-TAHAFUT(The Incoherence
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THE FOURTEENTH DISCUSSION: To refut
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occupies the central place in the u
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commentator of Plato and Aristotle,
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and Physics, have left the religion
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gives the philosophical arguments a
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eternity of the world. Plato himsel
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it is God who is passive; the impel
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of events out of time is like the u
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God everything is possible, a theor
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by the philosophers, of the emanati
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God possesses self-consciousness).
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and is found in Thomas Aquinas and
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He himself does not affirm that the
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is immortal when he will see in him
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For the unphilosophical, however, t
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Concerning the Eternity of the Worl
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for both agents, i.e. so far as the
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an agent endowed with a power which
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I say:analogous to our decision, it
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I sayinadmissible and that to admit
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I say:sun performs in twenty-four h
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possible, not necessary, and he wou
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valid so far as it concerns externa
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do not know of any one who makes a
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sophistical arguments is dishonest,
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say that the age of the world is a
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I say:that two blacks in two substr
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I say:inside the world, neither con
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similar things, a will which distin
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whereas the globe of heaven is homo
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constitute the poles. But the diffe
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move itself in space, in a definite
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deeds?’ May God make us perspicac
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seeing are equivalent in the eye. T
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would be no possibility of their av
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through the medium of a being etern
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This argument is sophistical. The t
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and with Him there was the world an
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I say:If we should say, for instanc
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The primitive meaning of the two wo
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of the fact that motion inheres nec
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and then assumes a time which has n
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I say:and places of the world. The
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I say:eternal. So much as far as bo
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I say:which doubles the whole of th
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I say:world smaller than He has cre
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I say:possible that the world might
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I say:and possible at another?’ I
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pronounce for one of these opposite
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I say:existence whether earlier or
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I say:and needs something to which
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I sayThe second proof is that the i
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I say:essence nor matter’ and the
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I sayalthough it is not impressed o
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Ghazali says:I say:As regards their
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I say:He wants to force those who a
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all his books this is most clearly
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extension is nothing but time, and
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concedes the existence of an entity
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I say:connected with another condit
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so only through the corruption and
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that it passes into a relative non-
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I say:the remainder; indeed He can
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This theory of the flux of all exis
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moments is constant, and how can wh
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I say:which has a reasonable sense,
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things are two: matter and form, an
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I say:an imposture where their prin
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I say:says that the lamp makes the
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anterior to it. If God therefore is
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it tends and has an inclination to
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and to exclude the metaphorical sen
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Ghazali says, answering in defence
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I say:connected with Him, since the
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from it, it exists, not when the th
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All this is true. The act of the ag
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of the water, for this happens afte
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existence of the celestial bodies o
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I say:We answer: The consequence of
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one occurred, they gave three answe
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is partly the cause of unity, partl
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I say:is therefore nineteen; and th
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each other is a theory not known am
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defined acts can only arise from be
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and earth that he should be of thos
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I say:another be identical?’ we a
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the universal, the other specific d
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similar follows concerning the nece
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I say:for this it really is. But th
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I say:from His way and deviate from
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We say:The philosophers tried to ac
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bodies prior to them. Thus they wer
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thinks only its own essence, and th
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suppose its agent to act like an ag
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draw this conclusion. For if the pr
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And that one and the same existent
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unique mover . And just as the remo
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a plurality of existents without a
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In this discussion of the intellect
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I say:The meaning of this statement
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I say:is the principle of these dif
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the possible nature cannot become n
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I say:a cause, what makes it imposs
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qualitative, or in whichsoever of t
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But if one should say to us: ‘Cer
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receive a stronger degree of assent
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as the differences depend on differ
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moment from its action, the world w
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And as to Ghazali's words:It is eas
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However, it is not possible that th
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without an initial term; and if you
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I say:The difference between these
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I say:cause, but not of the series
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I say:If it is objected that this m
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or non-eternity of the world, and w
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THE FIFTH DISCUSSIONTO SHOW THEIR I
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I say:colour because of a cause whi
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black must be a colour either by bl
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I say:The answer is that we concede
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I say:composed of genus and species
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necessary existent, and this is imp
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For man before his existence has a
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and it is thus their task to refer
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identical with the knower of the sh
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And when it is said that He is gene
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I say:separate from matter is possi
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exist both an essence and attribute
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by themselves, just as, if their ex
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If it is answered that the absolute
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I say:need a subject, as is the cas
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I say:If it is said: In the same wa
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would have to exist by itself, and
Page 267 and 268: essence is not true, for every esse
Page 269 and 270: Composition is not like existence,
Page 271 and 272: All their proofs where this problem
Page 273 and 274: consciousness itself is denied. But
Page 275 and 276: things, and our intellect, therefor
Page 277 and 278: I say:both, for the plurality and t
Page 279 and 280: be a knowledge in act and that ther
Page 281 and 282: It may be said that if it is assert
Page 283 and 284: And as to the affirmation of the ph
Page 285 and 286: two existents which differ in an ex
Page 287 and 288: Ghazali says:It may be said, `This
Page 289 and 290: I say:beings should exist by themse
Page 291 and 292: because they found that the acciden
Page 293 and 294: And as to the term `substance’ wh
Page 295 and 296: I say:black and white, fourness and
Page 297 and 298: I say:constitution of the essence o
Page 299 and 300: principle which is the cause of tha
Page 301 and 302: Gods would have to be separated by
Page 303 and 304: distinguished by the fact that one
Page 305 and 306: one of these natures is superior to
Page 307 and 308: Ghazali opposes this statement with
Page 309 and 310: against them about colouredness and
Page 311 and 312: I say:mediator, participates in thi
Page 313 and 314: application of the term ‘necessar
Page 315 and 316: meaning is to ask whether a thing p
Page 317: we have rent them . . . ‘and the
Page 321 and 322: I say:plurality and duality on the
Page 323 and 324: assume one thing eternal by itself
Page 325 and 326: I say:But the body is not a means f
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Page 329 and 330: wisdom in the product itself, namel
Page 331 and 332: his attacks on the philosophers in
Page 333 and 334: I say:not possible, and your statem
Page 335 and 336: together, and the difference betwee
Page 337 and 338: I say:universe is known to God, and
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Page 345 and 346: this conjunction and disjunction mu
Page 347 and 348: not imply (as he falsely affirms of
Page 349 and 350: I say:philosophers do, or abandon t
Page 351 and 352: consequences which follow from his
Page 353 and 354: But the knowledge of the Creator op
Page 355 and 356: I say:‘Well, let the seeing then
Page 357 and 358: acts which proceed from the arts, a
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Page 361 and 362: move in circles and that between th
Page 363 and 364: This is what we wanted to do first,
Page 365 and 366: the person who takes up different p
Page 367 and 368: universals must, by admitting in Hi
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and if you acknowledge an eternal w
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I say:But one may say: Why is this
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existents would be the cause of His
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I say:will, because His will has th
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they exclude heaven from this kind
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And as to his affirmation ‘that t
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also have to ask about these bodies
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THE FIFTEENTH DISCUSSIONTO REFUTE T
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Everything he says here about the p
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himself through trying to be in an
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For instance, when a man sees that
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on sublunary existence, so that, if
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I say:any case, has to be proved, s
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causes. Sometimes we know part of t
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particular perceptions; that is, th
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shows it to him by way of revelatio
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if, however, reason does riot perce
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And if they reverse this against us
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the irascible and the concupiscible
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study a problem common to theoretic
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terms of the conclusion are present
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The ancient philosophers did not di
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fire; for we regard it as possible
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To deny the existence of efficient
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is not necessary, the philosophers
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I say:notwithstanding the fact that
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fire-not, however, absolutely, but
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When the theologians admit that the
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the angels there should arise a qua
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serpent, and the scorpion, for thei
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identification of black and white i
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objectionable, and contrary to comm
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that the judgement of our intellect
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from the wolf while it walks behind
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I say:it receives from the angels k
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about its premisses, for the major
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I say:in the doctrine of the philos
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a faculty in a body; and it follows
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indivisible; if the relation, howev
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fainting, drunkenness, and the illn
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saying that knowing is the opposite
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Such arguments are all arguments of
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claimed to be its organ, so that it
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I say:his head than to his heels, a
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I say:others-yes, it may be that th
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I say:anger and the observation of
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that Plato was forced to introduce
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I say:thing occurs, does not produc
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separate substance has no opposite.
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The Fourth DiscussionHaving finishe
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which are attributed to Solomon. An
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And all this, as you see, is confus
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