Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

to give a satisfactory answer, they took refuge in the theory that the
eternal Will is a quality the nature of which is to differentiate between two
similar things, without there being for God a differentiating principle which
inclines Him to one of two similar acts; that the eternal Will is thus a quality
like warmth which gives heat or like knowledge which comprehends the
knowable. But their opponents, the philosophers, answered: It is
impossible that this should happen, for two similar things are equivalent
for the wilier, and his action can only attach itself to the one rather than to
the other through their being dissimilar, i.e. through one’s having a quality
the other has not. When, however, they are similar in every way and when
for God there is no differentiating principle at all, His will will attach itself to
both of them indifferently and, when this is the case-His will being the
cause of His act-the act will not attach itself to the one rather than to the
other, it will attach itself either to the two contrary actions simultaneously
or to neither of them at all, and both cases are absurd. The philosophers,
therefore, began their argument, as if they had it granted to them that all
things were equivalent in relation to the First Agent, and they forced them
to admit that there must be for God a differentiating principle which
precedes Him, which is absurd. When the theologians answered that will
is a quality the nature of which is to differentiate the similar from the
similar, in so far as it is similar, the philosophers objected that this is not
understood or meant by the idea of will. They therefore appear to reject
the principle which they granted them in the beginning.’ This is in short the
content of this section. It waves the argument from the original question to
the problem of the will; to shift one’s ground, however, is an act of
sophistry.
Ghazali answers in defence of the theological doctrine of the Divine Will:
There are two objections: First, as to your affirmation that
you cannot imagine this, do you know it by the necessity of
thought or through deduction? You can claim neither the one
nor the other. Your comparison with our will is a bad
analogy, which resembles that employed on the question of
God’s knowledge. Now God’s knowledge is different from
ours in several ways which we acknowledge. Therefore it is
not absurd to admit a difference in the will. Your affirmation
is like saying that an essence existing neither outside nor
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