Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

I say:
both, for the plurality and the difference of the object known
imply a plurality in the knowledge, since each of the two
objects known receives in the imagination the discrimination
which distinguishes it from the other. And therefore the
knowledge of the one cannot be identical with the knowledge
of the other, for in that case it would be impossible to
suppose the existence of the one without the other, and
indeed there could not be an other at all, since they would
both form an identical whole, and using for it the expression
`second intention’ does not make any difference. Further, I
should be pleased to know how he who says that not even
the weight of an atom, either in heaven or earth, escapes
God’s knowledge, ‘ intends to deny the plurality, unless by
saying that God knows the universe in a universal way.
However, the universals which form the objects of His
knowledge would be infinite, and still His knowledge which is
attached to them would remain one in every respect,
notwithstanding their plurality and their differentiation.
The summary of this is found in two questions. The first is, `How can its
knowledge of its own self be identical with its knowledge of another?’ The
answer to this has already been given, namely that there is something
analogous in the human mind which has led us to believe in the necessity
of its being in the First Intellect.
The second question is whether its knowledge is multiplied through the
plurality of its objects known and whether it comprehends all finite and
infinite knowables in a way which makes it possible that its knowledge
should comprehend the infinite. The answer to this question is that it is not
impossible that there should exist in the First Knowledge, notwithstanding
its unity, a distinction between the objects known, and it is not impossible,
according to the philosophers, that it should know a thing, different from
itself, and its own essence, through a knowledge which differs in such a
way that there should exist a plurality of knowledge. The only thing which
is absolutely impossible according to them is that the First Intellect should
be perfected through the intelligible and caused by it, and if the First
Intellect thought things different from itself in the way we do, it would be an
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