Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

indivisible; if the relation, however, of each part were related
to another part of the notion, then this notion would clearly
be divided, and this is impossible. And from this it is clear
that the things perceived which are in the five senses are
only images of the particular divided forms, and that the
meaning of perception is the arrival of the image of the thing
perceived in the soul of the perceiver, so that every part of
the image of the thing perceived is related to a part of the
bodily organ.
And the objection against this is what has been said
before. For by replacing the term ‘impression’ by ‘relation’
the difficulty is not removed which arises over the question
what of the hostility of the wolf is impressed on the
estimative faculty of the sheep, as we have mentioned; for
the perception is no doubt related to it, and with this relation
there must occur what you have said, and hostility is not a
measurable thing possessing a measurable quantity, so that
its image could be impressed on a measurable body and its
parts related to the parts of that body, and the fact that the
shape of the wolf is measurable does not remove the
difficulty, for the sheep perceives something else as well as
the shape, namely the adversity, opposition, and hostility,
and this hostility, added to the shape through the hostility,
has no magnitude, and still the sheep perceives it through a
body having magnitude; and that is necessarily a difficulty in
this proof as well as in the first.
And if someone says: ‘Do you not refute these proofs by
asserting that knowledge inheres in a spatial indivisible
body, namely the atom? ‘ we answer: ‘No, for the discussion
of the atom is connected with geometrical questions the
solution and discussion of which is long and arduous.
Further, such a theory would not remove the difficulty, for the
power and the will ought then also to be in this atom. For
man acts, and this acting cannot be imagined without power
and will, which would also be in this atom; and the power to
write resides in the hand and the fingers, but knowledge of it
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