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Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

a book on philosophy

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Such arguments are all arguments of people who have not grasped the

views of the philosophers about this problem. How little does a man

understand, who gives it as a proof of the soul’s survival that it does not

judge two opposites at the same time, for from this it follows only that the

substratum of the soul is one, and not divided in the way the substratum of

the accidents is divided; and it does not follow from the proof that the

substratum is not divided in the way the substratum of the accidents is

divided that the substratum is not divided at all.

Ghazali says:

The fifth proof is: If the intellect perceived the intelligibles

through a bodily organ, it would not know its own self. But

the consequent is impossible; therefore it knows its own self

and the antecedent is impossible. We answer: It is conceded

that from the exclusion of the contrary of the consequent the

contrary of the antecedent follows, ‘ but only when the

consequence of the antecedent has been previously

established, and we say we do not concede the necessity of

the consequence; and what is your proof?

And if it is said that the proof is that, because sight is in

the body, sight does not attach itself to sight, and the seeing

is not seen nor the hearing heard, and so on with respect to

the other senses; and if the intellect, too, could only perceive

through body it could not perceive itself, but the intellect

thinks itself just as it thinks other things, and it thinks that it

thinks itself and that it thinks other things-we answer: What

you assert is wrong on two points. The first is that according

to us sight could be attached to itself, just as one and the

same knowledge can be knowledge of other things and of

itself, only in the usual course of events this does not

happen; but according to us the interruption of the usual

course of events is possible. The second, and this is the

stronger argument, is for us to say that we concede this for

the senses; but why, if this is impossible for some senses, is

it impossible for others, and why is it impossible that there

should be a difference in the behaviour of the senses with

respect to perception although they are all in the body? just

451

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