Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

was given above: the temporal proceeds from the First Eternal, not in so
far as it is temporal but in so far as it is eternal, i.e. through being eternal
generically, though temporal in its parts. For according to the philosophers
an eternal being out of which a temporal being proceeds essentially’ is not
the First Eternal, but its acts, according to them, depend on the First
Eternal; i.e. the actualization of the condition for activity of the eternal,
which is not the First Eternal, depends on the First Eternal in the same
way as the temporal products depend on the First Eternal and this is a
dependence based on the universal, not on individuals.
After this Ghazali introduces an answer of the philosophers, in one of the
forms in which this theory can be represented, which amounts to this: A
temporal being proceeding from an eternal can only be represented by
means of a circular movement which resembles the eternal by not having
beginning or end and which resembles the temporal in so far as each part
of it is transient, so that this movement through the generation of its parts
is the principle of temporal things, and through the eternity of its totality the
activity of the eternal.
Then Ghazali argues against this view, according to which in the opinion
of the philosophers the temporal proceeds from the First Eternal, and says
to them:
I say:
Is this circular movement temporal or eternal? If it is
eternal, how does it become the principle for temporal
things? And if it is temporal, it will need another temporal
being and we shall have an infinite regress. And when you
say that it partially resembles the eternal, partially the
temporal, for it resembles the eternal in so far as it is
permanent and the temporal in so far as it arises anew, we
answer: Is it the principle of temporal things, because of its
permanence, or because of its arising anew? In the former
case, how can a temporal proceed from something because
of its permanence? And in the latter case, what arises anew
will need a cause for its arising anew, and we have an
infinite regress.
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