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Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

a book on philosophy

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I say:

And we say moreover to the philosophers: According to

your principles it is not absurd that there should be actual

units, qualitatively differentiated, which are infinite in number;

I am thinking of human souls, separated through death from

their bodies. These are therefore realities that can neither be

called even nor uneven. How will you refute the man who

affirms that this is necessarily absurd in the same way as

you claim the connexion between an eternal will and a

temporal creation to be necessarily absurd? This theory

about souls is that which Avicenna accented. and it is

perhaps Aristotle’s.

This argument is extremely weak. It says, in brief, ‘You philosophers

need not refute our assertion that what is a logical necessity for you is not

necessary, as you consider things possible which your adversaries

consider impossible by the necessity of thought. That is to say, just as you

consider things possible which your adversaries consider impossible, so

you consider things necessary which your adversaries do not consider so.

And you cannot bring a criterion for judging the two claims.’ It has already

been shown in the science of logic that this is a weak rhetorical or

sophistical kind of argument., The answer is that what we claim to be

necessarily true is objectively true, whereas what you claim as necessarily

absurd is not as you claim it to be. For this there is no other criterion than

immediate intuitive apprehension, just as, when one man claims that a line

is rhythmical and another denies it, the criterion is the intuition of the

sound understanding.

As for the thesis of a numerical plurality of immaterial souls, this is not a

theory acknowledged by the philosophers, for they regard matter as the

cause of numerical plurality and form as the cause of congruity in

numerical plurality. And that there should be a numerical plurality without

matter, having one unique form, is impossible. For in its description one

individual can only be distinguished from another accidentally, as there is

often another individual who participates in this descriptions but only

through their matter do individuals differ in reality. And also this: the

impossibility of an actual infinite is an acknowledged axiom in

philosophical theory, equally valid for material and immaterial things. We

48

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