Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

I say:
white for the knowledge of black, for they are two different
things. ‘ Besides, these species and genera and universal
accidents are infinite and they are different, and how can
different sciences fall under one science? Again, this
knowledge is the essence of the knower without any
addition, and I should like to know how an intelligent man
can regard the unity of the knowledge of one and the same
thing, when this knowledge is divided through its relations
with the past, the future, and the present, as impossible, and
uphold the unity of the knowledge which is attached to all
genera and all different species! For the diversity and the
distance between the genera and the remote species is far
greater than the difference which occurs in the conditions of
one thing which is divided through the division of time; and if
the former does not imply a plurality and differentiation, why
then does the latter? And as soon as it is proved that the
diversity of times is less important than the diversity of
genera and species, and that the latter does not imply a
plurality and a diversity, the former also will not imply this.
And if this does not imply a diversity, then it will be possible
that the whole universe should be comprehended in one
everlasting knowledge in everlasting time, and that this
should not imply a change in the essence of the knower.
This sophistry is based on the assimilation of Divine Knowledge to
human and the comparison of the one knowledge with the other, for man
perceives the individual through his senses, and universal existents
through his intellect, and the cause of his perception is the thing perceived
itself, and there is no doubt that the perception changes through the
change in the things perceived and that their plurality implies its plurality.
As to his answer that it is possible that there should exist a knowledge
the relation of which to the objects known is that kind of relation which
does not enter into the essence of the thing related, like the relation of
right and left, to that which has a right and a left his is an answer which
cannot be understood from the nature of human knowledge. ‘ And his
second objection, that those philosophers who affirm that God knows
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