Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

says that the ancients applied the term ‘imaginative faculty’ to the
estimative, and when they do this then the imaginative faculty in the
animal is a substitute for the cogitative faculty in man and will be located in
the middle ventricle of the brain. And when the term ‘imaginative’ is
applied to the faculty which apprehends shape, this is said to reside in the
foremost part of the brain. There is no contradiction in the fact that the
retentive and memorative faculties should both be in the posterior part of
the brain, for retaining and memory are two in function, but one in their
substratum. And what appears from the theory of the ancients is that the
imaginative faculty in the animal is that which determines that the wolf
should be an enemy of the sheep and that the sheep should be a friend of
the lamb, for the imaginative faculty is a perceptive ones and it necessarily
possesses judgement, and there is no need to introduce another faculty.
What Avicenna says would only be possible if the imaginative faculty were
not perceptive; and there is no sense in adding another faculty to the
imaginative in the animal, especially in an animal which possesses many
arts by nature, for its representations are not derived from the senses and
seem to be perceptions intermediary between the intellectual and the
sensible forms, and the question of these forms is concisely treated in De
sensu et sensato, and we shall leave this subject here and return to
Ghazali’s objections against the philosophers.
Ghazali says:
The first proof is that they say that intellectual cognitions
inhere in human souls, and are limited and have units which
cannot be divided, and therefore their substratum must also
be indivisible and every body is divisible, and this proves that
the substratum of the cognitions is something incorporeal. ‘
One can put this into a logical form according to the figures
of logic, but the easiest way is to say that if the substratum of
knowledge is a divisible body, then the knowledge which
inheres in it must be divisible too; but the inherent
knowledge is not divisible, and therefore the substratum is
not a body: and this is a mixed hypothetical syllogism in
which the consequent is denied, from which there follows the
denial of the antecedent in all cases; and there is no doubt
about the validity of this figure of the syllogism, nor again
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