Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

similar things, a will which distinguishes one from the other; of this he
gives examples. For instance, it is assumed that in front of a man there
are two dates, similar in every way, and it is supposed that he cannot take
them both at the same time. It is supposed that no special attraction need
be imagined for him in either of them, and that nevertheless he will of
necessity distinguish one of them by taking it. But this is an error. For,
when one supposes such a thing, and a wilier whom necessity prompts to
eat or to take the date, then it is by no means a matter of distinguishing
between two similar things when, in this condition, he takes one of the two
dates. It is nothing but the admission of an equivalence of two similar
things; for whichever of the two dates he may take, his aim will be attained
and his desire satisfied. His will attaches itself therefore merely to the
distinction between the fact of taking one of them and the fact of leaving
them altogether; it attaches itself by no means to the act of taking one
definite date and distinguishing this act from the act of leaving the other
(that is to say, when it is assumed that the desires for the two are equal);
he does not prefer the act of taking the one to the act of taking the other,
but he prefers the act of taking one of the two, whichever it may be, and
he gives a preference to the act of taking over the act of leaving.’ This is
self-evident. For distinguishing one from the other means giving a
preference to the one over the other, and one cannot give a
preponderance to one of two similar things in so far as it is similar to the
other-although in their existence as individuals they are not similar since
each of two individuals is different from the other by reason of a quality
exclusive to it. If, therefore, we assume that the will attaches itself to that
special character of one of them, then it can be imagined that the will
attaches to the.-one rather than the other because of the element of
difference existing in both. But then the will does not attach itself to two
similar objects, in so far as they are similar. This is, in short, the meaning
of Ghazali’s first objection. Then he gives his second objection against
those who deny the existence of a quality, distinguishing two similar
objects from one another.
Ghazali says:
The second objection is that we say: You in your system
also are unable to do without a principle differentiating
between two equals, for the world exists in virtue of a cause
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